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ABSTRACT
Community oriented policing (COP) has been adopted by a number of police 
departments throughout the country as a new policing philosophy. Some of the 
departments have implemented it in high crime areas and others have used it city-wide. 
The Omaha, Nebraska Police Department is currently in the process of implementing 
COP in the entire city. This has occurred gradually since 1989 when 15 officers were 
assigned to work in Omaha’s low-income housing developments. In 1990 these officers 
formed the Selective Patrol Unit and started practicing community oriented policing. A 
bicycle patrol was added in 1992 and COP expanded to other parts of Omaha with the 
Weed and Seed program. The city-wide implementation started in December 1993.
This paper is a preliminary analysis of COP in Omaha. Crime data and Omaha 
Conditions Surveys (OCS) from 1990 to 1994 were evaluated to determine if COP 
produced a change over time in crime and citizens’ answers to questions about crime and 
the police. The Omaha sample for the survey questions came from the Metropolitan 
portion of the OCS. The North Omaha portion of the OCS was used to select residents 
who lived in and around the Omaha Housing Authority’s (O.H.A.) low-income housing 
developments where the Selective Patrol Unit worked. The surveys didn’t indicate if 
respondents lived in or around the housing developments. So the O.H.A. sample 
contained individuals in the same zip codes as the housing developments with incomes
iv
below $10,000 per year. Because this sample may not represent the O.H.A. area, the 
findings may not reflect what is actually occurring there. Some of the data in the North 
Omaha portion of the OCS did not go beyond 1991 or the questions were not asked. 
Because of this I also looked for changes between whites and nonwhites or between the 
income categories.
Four hypotheses were tested: (1) Crime would decrease over time in Omaha as 
COP was implemented. UCR crime date and victimization surveys were evaluated for 
changes over time. The Omaha data didn’t support the hypothesis. In the O.H.A. area 
the crime data did support the hypothesis, but the decrease in victimization rates was not 
statistically significant. Nonwhites support the hypothesis and whites do not. For 
income it was mixed. (2) Citizens will perceive crime as less of a problem as COP is 
implemented. Citizens’ perceptions of the crime situation and the priority of crime 
problems were evaluated. There was no support for the hypothesis in Omaha and the race 
data. However, there was support in the O.H.A. area and the lowest income category. (3) 
A decline in the fear of crime will occur. No support was found in Omaha, but support 
was found in the O.H.A. area, with nonwhites, and the $0-9,999 income category. (4) 
Citizens’ quality of interaction with the OPD officers would improve as measured by 
their attitudes, perceptions, and satisfaction with the OPD. There was no support in 
Omaha and a conclusion was hard to draw in the O.H.A. area. For nonwhites and the 
$0-9,999 income category there were some improvement not reflected in Omaha.
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1CHAPTER 1
PERSPECTIVE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING
Since its inception, policing in America has undergone constant change. The 
modern-day police force began with foot patrol officers who were in close contact with 
the public. Technology enabled the police to change their patrol strategy. The 
automobile, two-way radio, and telephone moved the police to embrace preventive patrol 
and rapid response as a way to deter and reduce crime. These modem inventions 
enhanced communication and efficiency among police, but effectively isolated them from 
the people they were sworn to protect.
Beginning in the 1960s through today, the evolution continues. In some ways, 
policing has come full circle. There is a shift back to the police-citizen interactions 
gained through foot patrols, but lost when police were placed in patrol cars isolated from 
the public. The team policing models of the 1960s and early 1970s were bom from the 
realization that these interactions were critical. This philosophy continues into the 1990s 
with community policing and problem-oriented policing.
Throughout the years, a common theme developed. The focus was placed on 
policing neighborhoods and involving the citizens to help solve problems that produced 
the area’s crime and fear of crime.
2This concept of involving citizens currently falls under the broad category of
community oriented policing (COP), which encompasses the philosophies of community
policing and problem-oriented policing. As more police departments realize their current
approach of preventive patrol and rapid response is not effective in controlling crime,
they are turning to COP as a possible solution.
In November 1989, the Criminal Justice Newsletter estimated as many as 300 law
enforcement agencies were practicing community policing in one shape or another. I
suspect that current estimates are much higher. Community oriented policing is even
being practiced in other countries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Britain
(Clairmont, 1991; Leighton, 1991), and Israel (Friedmann, 1992). Robert Trojanowicz,
an advocate of community policing, said:
As we approach the 21st century, we see that community policing is the 
wave of the future . . .  Among the trendsetting big-city police departments 
nationwide, more than half have formally and visibly adopted community 
policing. As urban, rural, and suburban police departments of all sizes 
follow their lead, community policing makes the transition from being a 
promising trend to becoming the mainstream (October 1990:11).
The Omaha Police Department (OPD) in Omaha, Nebraska is also following suit
by changing its policing philosophy. Historically, the OPD has used the traditional
policing approach of preventive patrol and rapid response by placing their officers in
patrol cars. In 1989, the OPD initiated their COP effort by placing 15 officers into 5 low-
income housing developments to address increasing crime. In July 1990, the OPD and
the Omaha Housing Authority (O.H.A.) formed a partnership to further battle crime and
the residents' fear of crime in these housing developments. This partnership created the
3Omaha Police Department's Selective Patrol Unit (S.P.U.). The S.P.U. expanded 
operations by adding a bicycle patrol in the low-income housing areas in April 1992. In 
1993, the OPD started looking at the possibility of implementing community policing in 
their entire department and city-wide. Currently, they are going through the 
implementation process. This paper is a preliminary analysis of community oriented 
policing in Omaha.
Before I discuss COP in Omaha, I need to describe what it is. This first chapter 
contains sections on how COP evolved, and how cities nationwide are embracing it. To 
understand where policing has been and where it is going the approaches and 
philosophies of team policing, community policing, and problem-oriented policing will 
also be defined in this chapter.
Chapter Two offers the context and evaluation of past studies to determine the 
effectiveness of team policing, foot patrols, and community oriented policing. Some of 
these studies have shown that these police approaches have reduced the crime rates; 
lowered citizens' perception of crime and fear of crime; and improved citizens' attitudes, 
perceptions, and satisfaction with the police.
In Chapter Three, I will discuss what the Omaha Police Department has accom­
plished with COP and where they are going in the future. In Chapters Four and Five, I 
will describe how my analysis of Omaha's COP effort will be done and present the results 
showing any changes that occurred since the OPD implemented community oriented 
policing. This will be done using two different types of data. First, I will use Omaha's
4crime data provided by the Crime Analysis Bureau of the police department. I will also 
use selected questions from the Omaha Conditions Surveys that were conducted from 
1990 to 1994. Part of this evaluation will examine the effectiveness of the Selective 
Patrol Unit, Omaha's first COP effort.
Like the Omaha Police Department, many other cities introduced COP in areas 
where traditional methods had little impact. In Portland, Oregon the police department 
started a community oriented policing unit in the Columbia Villa Housing Project, a low- 
income housing development. This area experienced gang violence, heavy drug traffic, 
and drive-by shootings. "Children acted as lookouts and runners for the drug dealers; 
some even became small-time peddlers. Teens were pressured to join gangs and commit 
crimes against other residents as rights of initiation" (Englert, 1990:2).
The Housing Authority of Portland contacted the Multnomah County Sheriffs 
Office in April 1989 and asked them to provide police officers to work in the area for one 
year. The Sheriffs office responded and formed the Safety Action Team (SAT) 
composed of one lieutenant, three deputies, and two community service officers. Their 
goals were to reduce the fear of crime, reduce criminal activity in the project, and 
empower the tenants to regain control of the area. To accomplish these goals, the officers 
walked the area and talked to the residents. To provide the officers increased mobility, 
five mountain bikes were donated by two businesses and the Rotary Club. The officers 
identified drug dealers and gang members and warned them that they and their families 
would be evicted if the criminal activity continued. They also enforced trespassing
5ordinances on non-residents who caused problems. In addition, a Police Athletic League 
was established and outings organized for children. Job placements were provided for 
youth, and the elderly and handicapped received transportation in a marked police van,
Lieutenant Englert concluded that the SAT program was successful in meeting its 
three goals:
Within the first month of the SAT program, the fear of crime had 
been significantly reduced in Columbia Villa. As the fear of crime dimin­
ished, tenants gradually became confident enough to make detailed calls to 
the police and sheriffs department when criminal activity was observed.
Eventually, through the efforts of the SAT, an atmosphere of pride 
began to replace despair in the project. Because of the mobility of the 
SAT team and the newly acquired diligence of the residents, open air drug 
deals are no longer the norm in the project. Gang activity diminished as 
the gangs were denied new members. Now, the project's youth center 
activities around the SAT officers (Englert, 1990:5).
The strides COP has made in some areas appears to be dramatic, but as COP is 
rapidly becoming the "mainstream" approach to policing in many cities, it must be 
studied and scientifically evaluated to determine its effectiveness. Other policing 
approaches used through the years have also undergone this scrutiny. When team 
policing was the "mainstream" in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Schwartz and Clarren 
(1978) evaluated Cincinnati's effort to see if it was effective in reaching its stated goals. 
Additionally, Sherman, Milton, and Kelly (1973) evaluated team policing in seven cities 
to determine if they contained the basic elements essential to team policing. Foot patrol, 
a tactic used in COP, has also been examined to see if it reduces crime and fear of crime. 
Several studies have already occurred to evaluate some police departments' COP efforts. 
One fear reduction study was in Houston (Brown and Wycoff, 1987) and another was in
6Newark (Pate et al., 1985; Williams and Pate, 1987). Other cities include Flint 
(Trojanowicz, 1982); New York City (McElroy et al., 1993); and Oakland (Reiss, 1985). 
Problem-oriented policing has been evaluated in Newport News (Rck and Spelman, 
1987b) and Baltimore County (Cordner, 1985, 1986 and Taft, 1986).
It is essential that police departments learn from each other's failures and 
successes. Through this knowledge, a greater understanding of what works and what 
doesn't work is discerned. If COP is effective in reaching some of its goals, other police 
departments can learn from these efforts and implement them in their own jurisdictions.
For this reason, it is vital that changes in police practices and methods be analyzed 
to see if meaningful results occur. Past police techniques and practices must be 
understood to see how they have contributed to the evolution of community oriented 
policing. The rest of this section examines this evolution of policing, from early foot 
patrols to motorized patrols, team policing, and current COP efforts. Community 
policing and problem-oriented policing, two components of COP, will also be discussed.
How Community Policing Came About 
The philosophy of community policing has been accepted by many because of the 
growing realization that the traditional approach of preventive patrol and rapid response 
was not effective. To understand why, let's go back to when the modem police force 
began and briefly review police history.
When Sir Robert Peel started the first organized police force in London, his 
Bobbies were on foot and in close contact with the citizens they served. Their mission
7was to walk the streets so they could "be seen in every part of the beat every ten or fifteen 
minutes and thus to be available to assist citizens in need, to become acquainted with 
inhabitants, and to be a deterring presence for criminals" (Cole, 1989:221).
This policing model was soon adapted in the United States. However, with the 
professional reform that followed and technical advances such as the telephone, two-way 
radio, and automobile, police strategies changed. The telephone made it possible for 
citizens to call the police twenty-four hours a day. As calls increased, the police became 
reactive in their approach to law enforcement. The radio enabled the police to communi­
cate better with each other. It also contributed to reactive responses as officers, dispersed 
throughout the department's jurisdiction, were dispatched to calls by radio. Police were 
put in cars to increase response and reaction times, and cruised their area randomly to 
deter criminal activity. Police could now cover large geographic areas and arrive at the 
scene of an incident within minutes. The police philosophy soon shifted to preventive 
patrol and rapid response. The prevailing philosophy was that crime could be deterred by 
a visible motorized patrol (Sparrow et al., 1990). The police became reactive and police 
work was primarily incident-driven.
This philosophy was scrutinized beginning in the 1960's when the Uniform Crime 
Reports showed increases in crime during that time period. Also, in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s there were many grievances with police responses to civil rights demonstra­
tions, race riots, and political protests. These grievances produced questions from the 
public, government leaders, scholars, and police administrators about police practices and
8racial conflicts between minorities and the police. In fact, Samuel Walker said that the 
"vast majority of the riots of the 1964-1968 period were precipitated by an incident in­
volving the police" (Kenney, 1989:272), According to Goldstein (1990), this increasing 
hostility toward the police caused by the racial disturbances in the 1960s made the police 
aware that they had distanced themselves from minorities. Eck and Spelman (1987c) 
suggested that the riots in the 1960s caused the police to examine their community ties.
David Carter (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990) felt one of the solutions was 
for the police to establish communications with the community. He said that the 1967 
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice examined 
policing and recommended changes in how the police related to the community and how 
they delivered service. Carter continued by saying:
In 1968, two additional important series of government reports 
addressed the relationship between law enforcement and the community.
Both the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kemer 
Commission) and the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention 
of Violence examined the riots of the 1960s and the circumstances that 
contributed to civil disorder. Important findings indicated that the police 
paid too little attention to effective organization and deployment strategies 
and also to community issues and concerns (1990:166).
The first attempts to improve community ties were community relations units and 
civilian review boards. However, the community relations units didn't change the 
behavior of the street officers. Additionally, there were objections to the civilian review 
boards, so most of them were dismantled. Because of these apparent failures, police 
administrators then decided to initiate efforts that would increase police-citizen 
interaction.
9Researchers also questioned the effectiveness of random motorized preventive 
patrols, and incident-driven police work (rapid response) in deterring crime. According 
to Samuel Walker: "Community policing and problem-oriented policing have their roots 
in the police 'research revolution' of the 1960s and 1970s. A number of studies have 
challenged the assumptions underlying traditional police work" (1992:176).
One of these research projects was the 1972 Kansas City preventive patrol 
experiment (Kelling et al., 1974). This study found no significant difference in crime 
rates between the areas with increased patrol coverage and the areas with less patrol 
coverage. Walker (1992) said there were two significant findings from this experiment. 
First, increased patrols in an area didn't reduce crime. The second finding was that 
reducing patrols in a beat didn't lead to increases in crime. These findings revealed that 
officers on patrol have a lot of uncommitted time, and the time they do spend on random 
motorized patrol was not effective in deterring crime. This study "suggested that police 
departments could be more flexible in patrol assignment. They did not have to adhere to 
a rigid formula of maintaining continuous patrol coverage in all areas, twenty-four hours 
a day" (Walker, 1989:133). Police departments could pull their officers from random 
patrol and use them elsewhere without fear that the crime rate would increase in the area 
they were removed from. This study also found no significant differences between the 
areas and the level of citizens' fear or their satisfaction with police (Kelling et al., 1974).
Another study was done in Kansas City to examine how response times affected a 
suspect's apprehension. They discovered it was not police response times, but how
10
quickly people contacted the police that increased the chance of an arrest (Kansas City 
Police Department, 1980). These results challenged the long-standing assumption that 
rapid police responses were needed to increase the likelihood of an arrest and improve the 
residual effects of reducing and controlling crime. This study shows that rapid response 
alone was ineffective in catching suspects and suggests that the police could use their 
resources in more productive ways.
Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy said the problem with the traditional style of 
policing was that the:
. . . goals and methods are often too narrow and ineffectual to help troubled 
cities win back the ground they have lost. Even in less dire circumstances, 
traditional policing often cannot lend cities and neighborhoods all the 
support it might. Crime fighting, rapid response, and the like offer neither 
police nor residents much of a handle when it comes to addressing-far less 
preventing-such diffuse problems as fear and community tension (Sparrow 
et al., 1990:6).
As it became apparent from these studies and others that the methods being used 
were ineffective in controlling crime, eliminating the fear of crime, and increasing 
citizens' satisfaction with the police, researchers and police administrators started 
considering other means. Foot patrols were one of these approaches. Trojanowicz and 
Bucqueroux (1990) felt that community policing's roots grew from two such foot patrol 
experiments. One was in Newark, New Jersey and the other in Flint, Michigan. “Both 
experiments reflected the growing realization that something important may have been 
lost in the process of putting officers into patrol cars, and that there might be a way to
11
update the role of the old-fashioned beat cop to address contemporary community 
problems” (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990:7).
Others say an article by Wilson and Kelling (1987) titled "Broken Windows" was 
a major influence in changing the philosophy of the police toward community oriented 
policing. This article warned that one broken window left unrepaired would produce 
many more broken windows. Broken windows imply that nobody cares about the area, 
and even more physical deterioration is likely to result. It may even be an invitation to 
criminals. "Broken Windows" symbolizes "untended" behavior that causes the 
breakdown of community controls. This lack of community control may not lead to 
serious crime, but the residents may perceive a crime problem and fear of crime would 
exist because of the disorder and physical deterioration in the area. To correct this 
problem, the police would have to come into a neighborhood to prevent disorder and 
deterioration from occurring. By doing so, police would restore public order and create a 
safer neighborhood.
Because of the ineffectiveness of random and incident-driven policing methods, 
the idea soon emerged that if you want to develop crime fighting and order maintenance, 
citizens need to help the police by being involved in the "co-production of order". 
Thurman, Giacomazzi, and Bogen said that "co-production of order" is often called 
community policing, and explained this term by saying “ . . regardless of their prepared­
ness, the police cannot do the job alone-the public must be effectively involved in
12
reporting crime, volunteering their time to help the police, and actively participating in 
the problem solving of crime and related issues” (1993:554-555).
To accomplish these goals, the police needed to shift their approach to community 
orientation. To propagate this, there was a need to get back to the police-citizen interac­
tions lost when police were put in patrol cars and isolated from the public. Cole felt that:
the extensive use of motorized patrols has meant that residents have only a 
fleeting glimpse of officers as they cruise through their neighborhoods. In 
many urban areas the police are perceived as an outside force having little 
contact with the community and little knowledge or understanding of the 
problems peculiar to the neighborhood. In addition, it is argued, officers 
are not in a position to build up a rapport with residents that would 
increase cooperation (1989:220).
Community policing incorporates the basic concept of community orientation. 
This philosophy of community orientation has carried through from the 1960s team 
policing effort to community and problem-oriented policing of the 1980s and 1990s. 
"Despite the failure of the team policing concept in some agencies, the idea of a 
'community context of policing' has remained, due to increasing evidence that the 
bureaucratic model and conventional police practices have not been effective" (Riechers 
and Roberg, 1990:105). To gain a better understanding of community orientation, team 
policing, community policing, and problem-oriented policing need to be explained.
Team Policing
During the 1960s, team policing was attempted by many police departments as a 
way to regain this police-citizen interaction. According to Fink and Sealy (1974), team 
policing started in Aberdeen, Scotland as a patrol experiment in the late 1940s.
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The idea was to replace traditional beats with a larger district, to be 
patrolled by a team of constables under the command of a sergeant who 
had sufficient discretionary authority to adjust patrolling methods and 
administrative disposition of the men in his command to suit the needs of 
the district. The idea spread to Salford, England, in 1950, and to the 
United States in the early 1960s, when it made an experimental appearance 
in Syracuse, New York . . .  (Fink and Sealy, 1974:151).
Fink and Sealy continue by saying Syracuse contained a "new element appropriate to the
times-the participation of the community" (1974:152).
An important concept of team policing was the shift "from law enforcement to
order maintenance and conflict resolution" (Fink and Sealy, 1974:162). In 1973, the
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (NACCJSG)
emphasized the need to increase citizen-police cooperation as a way to "prevent and
control crime" (U.S. Department o f Justice, 1977:2). It noted that the police had become
isolated from the community. The basic rationale behind team policing was for the team
to learn "its neighborhood, its people and its problems" (NACCJSG, 1973:154).
One of the best definitions of team policing follows:
Total team policing can be defined as: (1) combining all line operations of 
patrol, traffic, and investigation into a single group under common 
supervision; (2) forming teams with a mixture of generalists and 
specialists; (3) permanently assigning the teams to geographic areas, and;
(4) charging the teams with responsibility for all police services within 
their respective areas. (NACCJSG, 1973:156)
Elements of team policing fell under two categories (U.S Department of Justice, 
1977). The first category included organizational and team building aspects. Officers 
permanently assigned to teams were responsible for a given neighborhood. By working 
as a team, they could provide better services to the community.
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This category also includes the ideas of enlarging the patrol officers' role and 
creating a situation where patrol officers and investigators work together on the team.
The patrol officers' roles were increased to include their participation in team and 
operational planning, and decision-making. This 1977 report by the U.S. Department of 
Justice said one of the primary goals was to encourage cooperation between patrolmen 
and detectives. The reason for having detectives on the team was to "streamline the 
investigative process and develop a more effective departmental investigative capability" 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 1977:5). This report continued by saying the 1967 
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice "pointed out 
that the rigid separation of patrol and investigative branches not only led to conflict 
between the two groups but also hindered efforts to solve crimes" (U.S. Department of 
Justice, 1977:1). This report also claimed that sharing information between patrolmen 
and detectives would produce better coordination of activities and police services.
The fourth key element called for a decentralized organization. Decision-making 
was to shift from the upper levels of police administrators to the patrol officers in the 
lower level of the department.
Team policing's second category of critical elements fell under community 
relations. First, officers were assigned to stable geographic areas. The officers worked in 
a defined neighborhood for an extensive period of time. This was done so the police 
could focus on the needs of their assigned neighborhood or geographic area. Permanent
15
assignment ensured that the officers would quickly learn their neighborhood and they 
could gain the trust of the residents (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977).
Service orientation and increased citizen contact was the second element under the 
community relations category. Officers would participate in community activities and 
use non-crime services to help citizens with some of their problems. To improve the 
image of the police and encourage the flow of information from the citizens, non-crime 
services were considered as important as law enforcement duties (U.S. Department of 
Justice, 1977; Fink and Sealy, 1974). The team was "encouraged to provide assistance to 
the people of the community, making job referrals for the unemployed, medical referrals 
for the ill or the addicted, and performing similar liaison services between the people and 
social agencies" (Fink and Sealy, 1974:155). The idea was that increased police-citizen 
contact would improve the public's trust and attitude toward the police, which in turn 
would improve communication between the two, causing the area's problems to be solved 
(U.S. Department of Justice, 1977). Foot patrols were extensively used as a way to 
accomplish this.
The third element in the community relations category sought to increase citizen 
participation in law enforcement. This was done through crime prevention programs, 
community meetings, volunteer programs, and advisory councils (U.S. Department of 
Justice, 1977).
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Although it seemed team policing was a strategy whose time had come, it 
"reached its peak in the early 1970s and then faded away quickly" (Walker, 1993:33). 
Despite this, the concept of community oriented policing has continued.
Key Components of Community Policing 
Many scholars, including Herman Goldstein (1987), Don Clairmont (1991), along 
with Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux (1990) say community policing is a 
philosophy. Trojanowicz points out that community policing is much different from 
police-community relations. He said:
Police-community relations is not a philosophy, but rather a 
limited approach that was often viewed as public relations aimed at 
reducing hostility toward the police among minorities. In essence, police- 
community relations implies a narrow, bureaucratic response to a specific 
problem, rather than a fundamental change in the overall mission of the 
department and increased expectations of the community (Oct, 1990:8).
Riechers and Roberg said although "community policing programs vary from city 
to city, they all share some common assumptions, goals, and characteristics" (1990:106). 
This philosophy is preventive and proactive in nature as the citizens and police work 
together to identify problems and solve their root cause by either law enforcement or non­
law enforcement means. Community policing "rejects the 'crime attack' model of 
policing in favor of an emphasis on order maintenance and quality of life problems" 
(Walker, 1993:39). Community policing strives to solve not only existing crime, but also 
disorder problems and physical deterioration in an area; because these problems are 
determined to be either a cause of crime or great concern to the residents.
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Community policing does not focus on quantitative measurements such as the 
number of arrests made, number of traffic tickets given, response times, or clearance rates 
that are so common in the traditional police department. Instead, community policing 
focus on "qualitative measures, such as citizen involvement, fear of crime, improvement 
in quality of life, and real and perceived improvement in chronic problems"
(Trojanowicz, 1990:9).
The principle of community policing is a partnership between the police and the 
community, where the community is a co-producer of solutions (Leighton, 1991) or as 
Thurman et al., (1993) said "co-production of order." The focus is on the neighborhood 
or community. In order to solve problems specific to an area, decentralized decision­
making needs to occur in the police department. "This involves enhanced decision 
making by relatively low-ranking officers on the basis of a high level of community 
input" (Walker, 1993:37). Normandeau (1993) said the police need to find out from the 
citizens their needs and expectations. Mary Ann Wycoff said:
. . . police and citizens should experience a larger number of nonthreaten­
ing, supportive interactions that should include efforts by police to
1. Listen to citizens, including those who are neither victims nor 
perpetrators of crimes;
2. Take seriously citizens' definitions of their problems, even when the 
problems they define might differ from ones the police would identify for 
them;
3. Solve the problems that have been identified (Greene and Mastrofski, 
1988:105).
According to Wycoff, listening to the citizens is based on a number of beliefs:
1. Citizens may legitimately have ideas about what they want and need 
from the police that may be different from what police believe they need;
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2. Citizens have the information about the problems and people in their 
areas that police need in order to operate effectively; and
3. Police and citizens each hold stereotypes about the other that, unless 
broken down by nonthreating contacts, prevent either group from making 
effective use of the other (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988:105-106).
Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux define community policing as:
. . .  a new philosophy of policing, based on the concept that police officers 
and private citizens working together in creative ways can help solve 
contemporary community problems related to crime, fear of crime, social 
and physical disorder, and neighborhood decay. The philosophy is 
predicated on the belief that achieving these goals requires that police 
departments develop a new relationship with the law-abiding people in the 
community, allowing them a greater voice in setting local police priorities 
and involving them in efforts to improve the overall quality of life in their 
neighborhoods. It shifts the focus of police work from handling random 
calls to solving community problems (1990:5).
When citizens nominate problems and help set police agendas, it "often reveals 
that the community views social and physical disorder - from potholes to panhandlers - as 
higher priorities than actual crime" (Trojanowicz, Oct 1990:11). As a result, police may 
spend a lot of time on issues not directly related to crime.
To solve community problems, some key technical components of community 
policing must be implemented. First, the police must come in close contact with the 
citizens. This close contact breaks down barriers between the police and the residents and 
improves communications. Wycoff describes four goals of increased police-citizen 
interaction:
1. A better attitude on the part of citizens toward the police;
2. A better attitude on the part of the police toward citizens;
3. More effective police service, with "service" and "effectiveness" being 
defined by the police; and
4. More effective police service, with citizens working together to define
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"service" and ['^effectiveness." These definitions might include: (a) the 
provision of more or different types of service by police, (b) an increase in 
order, (c) a reduction of levels of fear among citizens, and (d) a reduction 
in crime (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988:106).
To increase police-citizen contact and break down the barriers, officers need to be 
freed from their patrol car and radios to maintain daily contact with the citizens in the 
same beat every day (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux 1990). The permanent assignment of 
police officers to a neighborhood instills "mutual feelings of trust and responsibility 
between the officers and the community" (Riechers and Roberg, 1990:107-108).
To ensure the police remain visible and accessible, a number of tactics have been 
used. Storefront offices, foot patrols, bike patrols, motorcycle patrols, and horse patrols 
have been found to be extremely successful according to some reports of community 
policing. In a public housing complex in Tulsa, Oklahoma; Community Police Officers 
(CPOs) used a horse patrol to break down barriers. The horses were an icebreaker with 
the citizens. "This allowed both adults and children the excuse of petting the horse as an 
opportunity for them to tell the CPOs about problems, including drug dealing, without 
drawing undue attention to themselves" (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990:295).
Freeing the officers from their radios gives them a chance to talk and work with 
the residents without being constantly dispatched to calls. The officers have frequently 
complained that they don't have time to work the citizens' problems and concerns because 
they are too busy answering calls for service. The Los Angeles Police Department's 
Wilshire precinct found themselves in this situation.
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Street drug dealing was rampant; there were drunks everywhere; major 
streets had been all but taken over by prostitutes. The area seemed 
dangerous and uninviting, and Wilshire's respectable residents clamored 
constantly for increased police presence and attention. Many of Wilshire 
Area's patrol officers were frustrated too. Virtually all they did was 
answer 911 calls, many to situations that though indisputably important 
were not even remotely emergencies-scenes of stolen cars or burglaries 
many hours old-and they felt they were wasting their time (Sparrow et al., 
1990:8).
According to Cordner and Hale (1992), the Houston and Newark studies showed one of 
the successful components in community policing was when the officers were provided 
time to interact with the citizens.
With the barriers removed, the residents start talking to the police, provide them 
information about problems, and participate in solving the area's problems. The end 
result is another technical component - the residents become co-producers of solutions to 
the problems in the ares.
In 1985, the Los Angeles Police Department started the Wilshire Community 
Mobilization Project with eight SLOs (Senior Lead Officers). As residents got to know 
the officers, bonds formed. These bonds produced information on crimes. One 
individual came into the police station and told an officer he could give him information 
on a shooting that had occurred the day before. The officer then went out and picked up 
the suspect (Sparrow et al., 1990).
Public meetings and citizen advisory councils are another tactic used to break 
down barriers and get residents involved in the solutions. A number of police
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departments have been successful with these types of meetings, including Baltimore 
County and Philadelphia.
In each of Philadelphia's 23 police patrol districts, neighborhood 
advisory councils have been formed with the explicit purposes of (1) 
providing community access to police policymaking and (2) establishing 
an accountability linkage between the police and the consumers of police 
services, the public. These advisory councils meet regularly with district 
captains to identify and assess community problems, and jointly to 
determine strategies (police and community) to resolve those problems 
(Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990:385).
Other activities include establishing neighborhood watch programs, liaison officers,
police sponsored recreational programs, meeting residents and business owners, and
attending community meetings.
Two other components of community policing go together. They are "an
expanded police role in society . . . and greater linkage of the police service with the
'community' and external environment" (Clairmont, 1991:471). The officers' new role
emphasizes service as they become community organizers and planners, ombudsmen,
liaisons, and "brokers" of services (Walker, 1993; Greene and Mastrofski, 1988; Eck and
Spelman, 1987c) and not simply crime fighters.
To help solve problems in the community the police can organize the citizens or
seek help from agencies outside the police department. Many police departments have
formed partnerships with government agencies or private organizations to tackle
community problems. In some instances code enforcements are required, mental health
assistance is needed, roads need to be repaired, garbage collected, and playgrounds
repaired.
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In Madison, Wisconsin, one officer solved a gambling and drinking problem in a 
local park by getting city officials to pass an ordinance against gambling (Trojanowicz 
and Bucqueroux, 1990). Officers have also worked with city officials to clean up 
decaying neighborhoods and apartment complexes.
The Houston Police Department's efforts in the Link Valley apartment develop­
ment is an example of how civic organizations can help police solve neighborhood 
problems (Sparrow et al., 1990). In 1986, drug trafficking hit the area and quickly took it 
over. Many of the residents left the area and the abandoned apartments were taken over 
by drug dealers who catered to a drive-through clientele. The Stella Link Revitalization 
Coalition formed from several local civic associations and helped the police and the Link 
Valley residents reclaim their streets.
The solution was to focus on the customer because arresting the dealers was not 
working. If they took away the customers, the dealers would leave. The second approach 
was to tackle the area's physical decay. The plan was for the police:
to secure the streets of Link Valley and interrupt the flow of drive-through 
drug buyers. Mindful of the inefficacy of their traditional buy-and-bust 
tactics, they decided instead to throw a perimeter around the area, to block 
most access points and oversee, car by car, entrance through the few 
remaining (Sparrow et al., 1990:24).
They felt people wouldn't want to drive through the police roadblocks to purchase drugs.
The coalition's task was to clean up the area and repair or secure the apartments so drug
dealers could not move back in.
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The media publicized the plans well in advance, and when police arrived in Link 
Valley, they didn't find any drugs or dealers. The next day cleanup started. The cordon 
was kept in place for a month as some customers entered the area, but the drug trafficking 
stopped. "Link Valley has stayed quiet. The police operation, the cleanup, the physical 
improvements, and the attendant public spotlight have apparently broken the cycle of 
crime and decay permanently" (Sparrow et al., 1990:27).
Community Policing Vs. Problem-Oriented Policing 
Currently, there is a debate raging between criminal justice experts as to whether 
community policing and problem-oriented policing are the same. Community policing 
has some of the same elements as problem-oriented policing. The Criminal Justice 
Newsletter says, "Community-oriented policing is a generic term used to describe a 
variety of programs, also known in some cases as problem-oriented policing" (November 
1989:1). Cordner and Hale said problem-oriented policing is a "concept that comple­
ments community policing, and that has been developing both in conjunction with 
community policing and separately" (1992:13).
Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) believe community policing and problem- 
oriented policing are not the same. They said community policing uses problem-solving 
techniques as a tactic. Herman Goldstein, a proponent of problem-oriented policing, also 
says that problem-solving techniques are being used in some community policing 
programs. Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux continue by saying that police departments who 
use problem-oriented policing identify a problem to their officers through crime-mapping
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or crime analysis. With community policing the officer may discover the same problem
on his own. Herman Goldstein disagrees with this. He says with problem-oriented
policing, problems can be identified by the top-level management of a police department
as a city wide problem, or from an officer as a problem affecting a particular area (1990).
Although Goldstein (1987) feels efforts in community policing tie in with
problem-oriented policing, there are some differences. He says:
Problem-oriented policing goes a step further than what is commonly 
conveyed in community policing by asserting up front that the police job 
is not simply law enforcement, but dealing with a wide range of 
community problems-only some of which constitute violations of the law.
It further asserts that enforcement of the law is not an end in itself, but 
only one of several means by which the police can deal with the problems 
they are expected to handle (Goldstein, 1987:16).
Another difference Goldstein (1990) highlights is how the police engage the 
community. With community policing, a relationship is developed with all or parts of the 
community to reduce tensions, create goodwill, improve relations, and open communica­
tions between the police and the community. These ties are permanent, and the efforts 
are "more influenced by a desire to improve relations with the community" (Goldstein, 
1990:57) than by solving problems. In problem-oriented policing, if the police feel they 
need to get the community involved, then they bring in a specific group to help. The ties 
with the community last as long as the problem exists.
Goldstein says problem solving is less systematic with community policing. With 
problem-oriented policing, the objective is to solve a specific problem by systematic 
analysis. This entails much greater and detailed data collection and analysis of
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information about problems. "This means an in-depth probe of all of the characteristics
of a problem and the factors that contribute to it" (Goldstein, 1990:36).
With problem-oriented policing, the officers look for the underlying source of the
incident and intervene in the cause and effect cycle to eliminate the cause of the problem.
According to Goldstein:
Officers are encouraged to think in terms of problems rather than 
incidents. An officer permanently assigned to a community in a program 
that incorporates the problem approach is encouraged to pick up on the 
relationship between and among incidents occurring in the same family, in 
the same building, or in the same general neighborhood. The officer is 
encouraged to recognize related and recurring incidents as symptomatic of 
problems begging for solutions and to search for the solutions (1987:16).
Goldstein (1979) says there are three key elements of problem-oriented policing.
First, problems should be defined with greater specificity. Terms such as crime, robbery,
burglary, or theft are not specific enough. These behaviors can be attributed to a number
of different motives and occur under different circumstances. Goldstein said:
It seems desirable . . .  to press for as detailed a breakdown of problems as 
possible. In addition to distinguishing different forms of behavior and the 
apparent motivation . . .  it is helpful to be much more precise regarding 
locale and time of day, the type of people involved, and the type of people 
victimized. Different combinations of these variables may present 
different problems, posing different policy questions and calling for 
radically different solution (1979:246).
Eck and Spelman (1987a) call this "Scanning."
Goldstein's (1979) second key element is to research the problem. Eck and
Spelman (1987a) call this second part "Analysis" and summarize this element by saying
"information about problems must be collected from sources outside the police agency
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and not just from internal sources" (1987c:37). In other words, the police shouldn't just 
use their crime analysis statistics, but dig deeper into the problem using information and 
data from many sources. Eck and Spelman (1987c) suggest using businesses, other 
government agencies, and citizens. Goldstein (1990) said for the police to understand the 
problem they need to gather information from community surveys; interview people who 
are knowledgeable of the problem; conduct research of literature; look in police files; talk 
to officers, victims, and convicted offenders; and look at what other communities with 
similar problems had done. Cordner and Hale (1992) also agree that the police need to 
gather a lot of different data to identify and analyze problems.
The third element Goldstein (1979) discusses is to explore alternative solutions. 
Eck and Spelman (1987a) call this element "Response," and say the police "must engage 
in a broad search for solutions, including alternatives to the criminal justice process" (Eck 
and Spelman, 1987c:37). According to Goldstein (1990), these solutions can be tradi­
tional police responses if analysis indicates this to be the best solution. However, these 
solutions are not limited to measures for reducing crimes and they include "anything that 
might be done to deal with the problems the community looks to the police to handle" 
(Goldstein, 1990:104). They include referrals to other agencies and a coordinated police 
response with help from other agencies. At this point, the police may need to get citizens 
or other public and private agencies involved. Other solutions may include enforcing 
laws the police don't normally focus on, such as building code violations, or trespassing.
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Baltimore County's COPE program was successful in tackling problems that were 
“not normally considered to be within the realm of law enforcement responsibilities, but 
nevertheless contribute to fear among citizens, e.g., inadequate streetlighting, closed 
playground, overgrown lots, neglected potholes, uncollected garbage, and dilapidated 
houses or buildings” (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990:389). In Baltimore County, 
the police conducted an in-depth investigation and convinced the county's development 
agency to start legal action against a landlord who had taken out a loan to fix building 
violations but had not made the improvements. In the Loch Raven Apartments, 
burglaries were averaging six a month and there were many street robberies. The COPE 
officers noted that the apartment complex had structural damage, street and building 
lights were broken, people could hide in trees and shrubs because they were unkempt, 
and the area was infested with rats and stray dogs. The police got a number of 
organizations together to help the residents. Two local neighborhood associations helped 
the residents form their own association; Baltimore Gas and Electric repaired street lights; 
and Animal Control, Health, Fire, and Housing Departments put pressure on the 
apartment manager to repair the buildings. The living conditions improve, robberies 
stopped, and the burglaries dropped to one every two months (Eck and Spelman, 1987c).
There was also a similar success in Newport News where the New Briarfield 
Apartment complex had a large number of burglaries and the highest crime rate in the 
city. The police found out that the owners were in default on a loan from HUD and were 
about to foreclose. The police chief worked with other city agencies and they convinced
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the city managers that it would be cheaper to tear down the complex and build a new one 
then bring it up to standards.
Eck and Spelman (1987a) take Goldstein's approach one step fiirther by adding a 
forth element called "Assessment.” In this step, officers evaluate a solution to see if it 
was effective in solving the problem. If the problem had not been corrected, then any of 
the above three steps could be initiated again.
As I mentioned earlier, community policing and problem-oriented policing share 
some of the same components and both exist under the umbrella of COP. The intent of 
this section was to show similarities between the two and the many ideas they share. In 
fact, many police departments implementing community policing have also incorporated 
the elements inherent in problem-oriented policing. Goldstein (1990) identifies Flint, 
Michigan; New York City; and Los Angeles, California as departments that have done 
this. The Omaha Police Department is another one.
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CHAPTER 2 
PAST STUDIES
Numerous studies have been conducted since the 1970s to evaluate the 
effectiveness of police strategies that employ the concept of police-citizen interaction. 
These studies include the Cincinnati Team Policing program in the early 1970s, foot 
patrol experiments in the late 1970s to early 1980s, and COP during the 1980s. Many of 
these evaluations used some of the same measurable variables to test their hypotheses that 
I will use to evaluate the Omaha Police Department in the final chapter of this thesis.
In the next few sections of this chapter, I will discuss some of the hypotheses of 
these past studies and the variables used to test them. Although I use the term COP in 
these hypotheses, each of the studies mentioned above can be substituted.
Hypotheses and Associated Variables
Crime and victimization have been evaluated in almost all of these past studies. 
The hypothesis says that fewer crimes will occur in areas that have COP than in areas that 
don't. One of the reasons this should occur is because COP focuses on the area's crime 
problems and is more proactive than a patrol that just responds to calls for service. 
Through problem intervention, the police may prevent a future crime from occurring as 
they eliminate opportunities for crime by fixing the root cause; thus driving the offenders 
out of the area. Additionally, because of their trenchant presence, the police may be more
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of a deterrent than a random vehicle patrol. Another reason why crime should decrease is 
related to the increased police-citizen contact. As barriers are broken down, citizens may 
provide the police more information about crimes or help in other ways to rid the area of 
crime.
The crime data usually evaluated are the UCR Part I and II offenses. There are 
two problems with interpreting UCR data. First, many crimes are never reported to the 
police so it is difficult to evaluate changes. Another problem that should be considered is 
that more crimes may be reported as the residents get to know the police and trust them 
more. To adjust for these problems, victimization surveys are also conducted to measure 
changes in crime.
Disorder problems, sometimes called social disorder, have also been evaluated. 
The hypothesis tests Wilson and Kelling's "Broken Windows" theory that COP can 
reduce disorder and neighborhood decay. Although these problems are considered less 
serious than the UCR Part I Index crimes, many residents feel they must be addressed. 
They consist of things such as a loud party, a group of rowdy teenagers, prostitution, the 
homeless, drunks, or drug addicts. The same reason that COP should be effective on 
crime holds true for this category. The variables analyzed are obtained from citizen 
surveys designed to measure their perceptions of these problems.
Citizens' perception of crime in the areas has been evaluated to test the hypothesis 
that citizens will notice less crime in the COP area. Numerous variables are used in this
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analysis including asking respondents about categories of crime, specific crimes, or about 
their general perception of the area's crime problems as a whole.
Fear or worry about crime has also been studied. The hypothesis is that COP 
reduces citizens' fear or worry about crime and social disorder more than the traditional 
police approach. "The traditional police response to fear of crime has been to attack 
crime, in the hope that reducing crime overall will ultimately lessen fear" (Trojanowicz 
and Bucqueroux 1990:131). The Kansas City studies showed that random patrols and 
rapid response weren't effective in reducing crime, fear of crime, or increasing the chance 
of making an arrest at the crime scene (Kelling et al., 1974; Kansas City Police 
Department, 1980). Because crime was not deterred, citizens' fear of crime was not 
lowered. The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Study (Kelling et al., 1974) also found that 
people didn’t notice an increase in patrol coverage. With COP, the citizens should notice 
the police more and become less fearful of crime because of the deterrent effect produced 
by their presence.
Fear can also come from the disorder problems in the area. The traditional police 
response has focused on more serious crimes, not some of the lesser disorder problems 
that affect most cities. With COP, the police may attack some of these disorder 
problems, thus reducing residents' fear.
Variables used to determine fear and worry about crime have been measured with 
surveys. Respondents were asked to rate their fear or worry about crime in the area,
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along with their concern of being a victim of crime or specific types of crime. Self- 
protective measures have also been used. The expectation is that as these measures 
decrease, citizens feel safer and fear crime less.
Citizens’ satisfaction with the area is the fifth type of evaluation conducted. This 
hypothesis states that citizens will be more satisfied with an area that utilizes a COP 
philosophy than with one that doesn't. Increased satisfaction occurs because the residents 
feel somebody cares about them and wants to improve their quality o f life by reducing 
crime and disorder problems. This variable is measured by surveys that ask respondents 
the degree of satisfaction they’have with the area or if the area has improved.
A final evaluation frequently conducted is on police-citizen relationships. Here, 
they test the hypothesis that citizens in COP areas more positively rate the police than in 
areas served by the traditional motorized patrol. This occurs because the police are taking 
an active part and showing the residents that they care about them and their environment. 
The variables measured are collected by surveys and include citizens’ satisfaction with the 
police, perceptions of how the police treated them, their perceptions of the officers' 
attitudes, and how effective they feel the police are.
The remainder of this section will discuss a number of studies, the variables used 
to test these hypotheses, and their findings. I will also explain the experimental design 
used. Some of the studies were questionable because of either design flaws or lack of 
statistical analysis. These problems make it impossible to determine the effectiveness of 
the strategy tested. Additionally, some of the studies contained more than one
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experimental treatment associated with community policing. I will report the results from 
each one separately. It is essential in our exploration of COP to know what was effective 
and if the hypothesis was supported. In the conclusion of this chapter, I will show how 
the studies support a particular hypothesis.
The Cincinnati Team Policing Experiment 
The Cincinnati Community Sector Team Policing (COMSEC) experiment was 
evaluated by The Urban Institute for the Police Foundation (Schwartz and Clarren, 1978). 
The "experiment and evaluation lasted from March 1973 until September 1975. Its major 
goals were to reduce crime and improve police-community relations" (Schwartz and 
Clarren, 1978:3). It was initiated in District 1 where 25 percent of the city's reported 
crimes occurred. This district contained a business area, along with middle-class and 
low-income residential areas. The district was divided into six sectors and a team was 
assigned to each sector.
Surveys of citizens and small businesses were used to determine their perceptions 
of crime and the police. Five surveys were conducted. The first was at the beginning of 
the experiment then at the 6, 12, 18, and 30 month time periods. The results from District 
1 were compared with the results from Cincinnati's other districts. During the first 18 
months of COMSEC, the number of citizens in District 1 who reported feeling "very 
unsafe" walking in their neighborhoods at night decreased; but in the rest of the city no 
significant improvements were noted. District 1 residents also reported being less fearful 
of traveling in Cincinnati. This decrease was greater than the decrease in the rest o f the
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city. Citizens' satisfaction with police service did not change, but remained high during
the experiment in both District 1 and the rest of the city.
The crime data was analyzed using UCR Part I and Part II crimes. This data was
collected from August 1971 to August 1975 and was broken down into seven 26-week
periods. Two of the periods were before COMSEC was implemented (March 1972 -
March 1973), and the other five periods were during COMSEC (March 1973 - August
1975). A time series analysis was used to evaluate reported crimes. Burglary showed a
significant decrease in District 1 during the first 18 months and increased in the rest of the
city except for a decrease in District 7. This decrease in District 7 was not as great as in
District 1. After 30 months burglary increased in District 1, however it was still lower
than before COMSEC. For the other reported Part I crimes there appeared to be no
measurable effect from COMSEC.
The analysis of victimization surveys found that burglary and robbery of
businesses in District 1 declined during the first 18 months, and remained steady for the
rest of the city. But in the last year of the program, the rates in District 1 returned to the
levels before the program started.
These findings in Cincinnati may not be a true representation of what could have
been accomplished. The authors pointed out that the program eroded gradually after the
six-month point as the officers felt that management failed to support team policing.
After 18 months of team policing, COMSEC officer expressed the belief 
that police managers had returned to pre-COMSEC operations and 
philosophy, with only the administrative structure of team policing 
remaining.
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Consequently, in analyzing the experimental findings, the last year 
of the study (between 18 and 30 months after implementation) is believed 
to be unrepresentative of the impact of a fully functioning team policing 
program (Schwartz and Clarren, 1978:25).
Foot Patrols
A myriad of police departments have used foot patrols to increase police-citizen 
interaction. Some departments have used them by themselves or in conjunction with 
other activities as part of their COP efforts. The findings from four of these studies will 
be discussed on the following pages. The mixed results make it difficult to come to a 
general conclusion on the effectiveness of foot patrols. One conclusion that appears to be 
fairly consistent is that foot patrols did not reduce crime.
One of the first experiments was conducted in Newark, New Jersey from 1978- 
1979 by the Police Foundation (1981). The project was designed to introduce foot patrol 
officers to upgrade and stabilize target neighborhoods. According to Greene and 
Mastrofski (1988), they wanted to address the untended property and untended behavior 
defined as a community problem in the "Broken Windows" article. Eight beats had been 
patrolled on foot consistently since the beginning of the Safe and Clean Neighborhoods 
Program. These beats were matched into four sets of two beats each. One beat was 
selected to continue foot patrols, and they were terminated in the other beat.
Additionally, foot patrols were started in four new areas.
Using victimization surveys and reported crime, the Police Foundation concluded 
that foot patrols didn't have a significant effect on the crime level. In support of foot
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patrols, the report said that citizens' fear of crime went down and feelings of personal 
safety increased when foot patrols were added. This was further validated when they 
found a reduction in die use of self-protective measures in the beats where foot patrols 
were added. Additionally, residents in the beats where foot patrols were added also noted 
a much greater decline in the severity of crime problems than in the other two areas and 
evaluated police performance as being better.
Another study was conducted in Flint, Michigan from 1978-1981 (Trojanowicz, 
1982). The effort in Flint went further than the Newark experiment. In Newark, they 
used foot patrols as a limited tactic to see if they could deter crime. But in Flint, foot 
patrol officers were used as part of a strategy to involve police in community problem­
solving.
In addition to law enforcement responsibilities, foot patrol officers in Flint 
were charged with being 'catalytic agents who encouraged citizens to band 
together in the effort to combat crime1. Such activities reflect the 
expanded police role envisioned by Wilson and Kelling (Greene and 
Mastrofski, 1988:207).
Fourteen neighborhoods were targeted by placing twenty-two foot patrol officers 
into neighborhood base stations. These foot patrols were in addition to motorized patrols, 
crime prevention, and undercover operations. The neighborhoods were selected because 
of crime concerns, and because they exhibited the strong citizen support that was 
essential for its success (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990). The results from the foot 
patrol areas were compared with the control areas that did not have foot patrols.
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The crimes evaluated were burglary; automobile theft; assault; vandalism;
robbery; criminal sexual assault; and larceny from a home, a person, or a vehicle.
Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) reported that crimes declined by 8.7 percent in the
experimental neighborhoods, while in the city as a whole crime increased.
Breaking the figures down further, of the nine crimes analyzed, all except 
burglary and robbery declined over the three years, with criminal sexual 
conduct down most (46%). If burglary and robbery are subtracted from 
the total, the rate for the remaining seven crimes dropped 21.8% during the 
experiment (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990:215).
Cole (1989) said robberies and burglaries increased in the city as a whole, but didn't
increase at the same rate in the experimental beats.
To see what residents thought about the crime problems in the area, Trojanowicz
used a panel sample to survey the same individuals over a three-year period. At the end
of this period, 48 percent of the residents felt foot patrols had reduced crime in their
areas, 15 percent said it had not, while 37 percent had no opinion (Trojanowicz and
Bucqueroux, 1990).
When the people surveyed the third year were asked if they felt crime was 
a more serious problem in their neighborhoods, compared to other 
neighborhood, only 14% said this was true. Roughly half (49%) said their 
area had fewer crime problems, while another 26% rated the crime 
problem in their area as average (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux,
1990:217).
He also reported that the panel said, "their victimization rate was cut in half by the end of 
the third year of foot patrol" (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990:219).
Additionally, he asked about their fear of crime. "At the end of the third year, 
roughly 70% of those surveyed reported feeling safer as a result of foot patrol...This
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perception of safety increased each year during the three years of the experiment" 
(Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990:216-17).
There were problems that make this study's findings questionable. First is the 
problem with the survey used to determine citizens' perceptions of reduced crime and 
public safety. There was nearly a 50 percent panel mortality as the researchers lost 
almost half of their survey participants by the end of the third year. In a book edited by 
Greene and Mastrofski, this problem was discussed in a chapter authored by Greene and 
Taylor.
A panel of local community residents-6 from each of the 14 patrol areas- 
reported on citizen perceptions of crime and public safety. By the third 
year of the evaluation, the total number of panel residents had declined to 
44. Such a high level of respondent mortality makes inferences about the 
program effects tenuous (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988:207).
Pate (Kenney, 1989) noted that because the panel sample was small, averaging three
people per area, the validity was in question.
Greene and Taylor pointed out other problems. There were no tests of statistical
significance used to measure citizens' fear of crime or the reduction in crime. They also
noted that there was no mention of any controls for the displacement effect; and because
there were wide variations in reported crime between the foot patrol areas, they didn't feel
that foot patrols caused the crime reduction. They said:
. . .  in certain foot patrol areas, crime declined by as much as 66 percent, 
while in others, crime increased by as much as 52 percent. Crimes such as 
vandalism and assault decreased when examined across foot patrol areas, 
while robbery increased. This pattern suggests that crime rate changes in 
program areas were not influenced by the foot patrol program, but rather
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were driven by local dynamics in each area (Greene and Mastrofski,
1988:207).
One last problem with this study dealt with the control beats. The study started 
out with twenty-two police officers in fourteen beats and later went to forty-four officers 
in forty-four beats, then down to thirty-six officers in thirty-six beats. Eventually, the 
whole city was covered by foot patrols (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990). Because 
the control beats were constantly changing, it was impossible to control for the 
experiment.
In 1983 a study in Boston was conducted (Bowers and Hirsch, 1986), where 300 
officers were placed on foot patrol throughout the city. These officers were responsible 
for less serious crime and non-crime service calls. The researchers wanted to examine 
changes in the priority of calls-for-service (serious crime, less serious crime, and non­
crime related) among the 105 beats based on the different levels of foot patrol (high, 
medium, low, unstaffed, or no change). They analyzed differences in the priority of calls 
received from 1981 to 1984.
Greene and Taylor (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988) said no statistical differences 
were noted between the level of foot patrol service and crime control or order 
maintenance. The types of crime were not affected by the level of foot patrol activity.
Violent crimes, such as aggravated or simple assault, were unaffected by 
changes in foot patrol staffing, while street robbery dropped but 
commercial robbery rose in the foot patrol beats with added staffing.
Property offenses actually increased in the foot patrol beats where 
additional officers had been added, suggesting some reporting effects, 
although burglary produced little change. Disturbance behaviors, those 
most closely associated with the order maintenance activities of the police,
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fluctuated across the high staffing beats but in inconsistent directions; 
minor disturbances increased, gang calls increased, and noisy parties 
dropped. (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988:214)
Police involvement in area problems is an important element in COP, and one of 
the tactics in COP is foot patrol. This involvement may be more important than simply 
having an officer in the area. Ben Davis uses a quote by Robert Trojanowicz to elaborate 
on this:
. . .  if an officer's walking along (the beat) in the traditional way, he won't 
affect the crime rate. Patrolmen who operate that way are just motorized 
officers without a car. Basically, they're doorshakers. But when the 
officer becomes actively involved in the community, that's when crime 
problems begin to be solved (Davis, 1984:41).
To determine if just the foot patrol tactic or a COP program called "ombudsman 
policing" was more effective, Antony Pate (Kenney, 1989) evaluated a 1986-1987 
experiment in Baltimore. Ombudsman policing was "an effort by police officers to 
ascertain and address the problems identified by residents of particular neighborhoods" 
(Kenney, 1989:119). Two different neighborhoods were picked; South Baltimore, 
located in southeast Baltimore, and New Northwood/Howard Park, located in northwest 
Baltimore. Three experimental areas in each neighborhood were selected to randomly 
receive the treatment of either foot patrol, ombudsman policing, or no new police 
program. A random panel sample of residents in each of the six experimental areas was 
surveyed before and 12 months after the experimental treatment started. They also 
evaluated crime data for the six areas going back 29 months prior to the start of the 
experiment.
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The analysis of the survey questions produced a number of findings that appear to 
favor ombudsman policing over foot patrols. First, there were statistically significant 
improvements in the evaluation of police effecti veness in both ombudsman policing 
areas. In the foot patrol areas a decrease in police effectiveness was found.
Citizens' perceptions of area problems were also evaluated. When respondents 
were asked about disorder problems, statistically significant reductions were found in the 
ombudsman policing areas, and statistically significant increases were noted in the foot 
patrol areas. For perceived property and personal crime, the two ombudsman areas 
showed a reduction in both types of crime, but it was not statistically significant. For foot 
patrol it was mixed as the southeast area showed an increase and the northwest area a 
decrease in both types of crimes. When asked about the "likelihood of crime," all of the 
areas except the foot patrol in the southeast had a decrease. As for area safety, all areas 
had an increase.
The surveys also asked respondents if they had been a victim of a burglary, 
larceny from person, larceny from auto, auto theft, vandalism, assault, or robbery. The 
only statistically significant reduction was auto theft in the ombudsman policing areas. 
There were several statistically significant findings when respondents were asked if they 
knew anybody living in the area who had been a victim of these crimes. When both foot 
patrol areas were combined, six of the crimes showed statistically significant reductions. 
When both ombudsman policing areas were combined; awareness of all crimes decreas­
ed, but only assault was statistically significant. When the foot patrol areas were
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evaluated separately by neighborhood, all the crimes in the northwest area decreased, but 
in the southeast area three increased. A mixed result also occurred in the ombudsman 
area when evaluated individually. Burglary, larceny from auto, and vandalism increased 
in one neighborhood and decreased in the other.
The analysis of reported crime was broken down into Part I and Part II crimes. 
When both areas were combined, the foot patrol and ombudsman areas had a reduction in 
both types of crimes, but the only statistically significant decrease occurred in the 
ombudsman policing areas for Part II crimes. A separate analysis of Part I crimes showed 
a decrease in all areas except the northwest ombudsman area; and for Part II crimes all 
areas decreased except the southeast foot patrol area.
The positive findings in this study for ombudsman policing would lead you to 
believe that citizens' worry about crime would decrease. But when the residents were 
asked, both foot patrol areas and the ombudsman area in the northwest had an increase. 
The ombudsman area in the southeast neighborhood had the only decrease.
Other Community Oriented Policing Studies 
Other studies were conducted that went beyond simply putting foot patrol officers 
in areas. These studies were designed to either evaluate elements of COP or the whole 
philosophy. The National Institute of Justice funded research to evaluate different law 
enforcement programs designed to address the problems of fear of crime, disorder, the 
quality of police service, citizens' satisfaction with their neighborhood, and crime. The 
Police Foundation was given a grant to evaluate the programs; one in Newark, New
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Jersey (Pate et al., 1985; Williams and Pate, 1987) and the other one was in Houston, 
Texas (Brown and Wycoff, 1987). Both studies were conducted from 1983-1984.
In the Newark study, a task force was put together to look at the reasons behind 
the fear of crime and ways to deal with it. The task force determined that fear of crime 
was caused by three sources.
The first source of fear was that citizens lacked local information about crimes 
and ways to prevent them. Their solution was for the police to develop, publish, and 
distribute a monthly newsletter designed to increase crime prevention activities.
The second source was categorized as "signs of crime." Social disorder and 
physical deterioration were considered here. They had two approaches in their solution. 
First, they established a Directed Patrol Task Force of twenty-four officers who perform­
ed specific operations in their areas at least three evenings per week. Some of these 
functions were foot patrols to enforce laws and maintain order, bus checks to enforce 
ordinances and maintain order on the buses, enforcement of state disorderly conduct laws 
to reduce loitering and disruptive behavior, and vehicle checkpoints. Their second 
approach was a neighborhood clean-up to attack the physical deterioration. Included here 
were efforts to repair streets, improve lighting, and collect garbage.
The task force determined that limited quantity and quality of contacts between 
the police and the public was the third source of fear of crime. They proposed a coordi­
nated community policing policy as the solution. This solution:
. . . was designed to address all three major causes of fear identified by the
task force:lack of information; sense of distance between ordinary citizens
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and the police; and the social and physical signs of crime. Specifically, 
besides replicating the newsletter and the signs of crime programs, this 
coordinated effort included a police community center and a directed 
police-citizen contact component (Williams and Pate, 1987:58).
A "storefront" office was established so citizens could walk in and report crimes.
The officers used the police-citizen contact program to meet with residents and determine
what their concerns, fears, and problems were; and to distribute crime prevention
information and a police newsletter. Wycoff said this project also included "intensified
law enforcement and order maintenance" (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988:108).
Three neighborhoods were selected along with a control area. "Each area
consisted of about 18 square blocks and contained approximately 4,500, largely black
residents of low- to middle-income levels, living in about 1,500 units" (Williams and
Pate, 1987:60).
Williams and Pate reported that the newsletter and "signs of crime" (including the 
Directed Patrol Task Force and neighborhood clean-up) programs were not effective in 
reducing the fear of crime. They felt that the "signs of crime" program may not have 
been successful "because the enforcement efforts were implemented at random and 
without extensive contact with citizens" (1987:67). The coordinated community policing 
program with its close and frequent police contact with the citizens had the greatest 
impact and appeared to be the only successful part of this study. A regression analyses 
for this program was conducted on the cross-section and panel data. Results on both sets 
of data indicated significant differences for: reductions in perceived social disorder 
problems, reductions in worry about property crime, reductions in the level of perceived
45
area property crime problems, and improvements in evaluations of police service. In 
addition, the panel data showed two other significant findings: a decline in fear of 
personal victimization and an increase in satisfaction with the area.
The Houston study contained five strategies that were designed and implemented 
by a task force composed of nine officers and one civilian employee of the police 
department. First, was a victim recontact program. "This strategy was designed to 
demonstrate police concern for victims. Police officers contacted recent crime victims by 
telephone to express the Department's sympathy and to ask whether the victims needed 
any assistance" (Brown and Wycoff, 1987:75). A community newsletter was also 
distributed. The newsletter included crimes that were prevented or solved and crime 
prevention tips. A citizen contact patrol program was the third strategy implemented. 
During their tour of duty, officers would stop and visit with residents at their homes, 
stores or offices. The officers would introduce themselves and ask if there were any 
problems in the area the police should know about. The fourth strategy was a police 
storefront office established in one neighborhood. Finally there was a program started to 
organize the community's interest in crime prevention. Block meetings were held and a 
group of residents were identified to meet with the police and discuss area problems 
along with possible solutions. This group conducted a neighborhood clean-up campaign, 
a drug information seminar, identified "safe houses" for children, and established a 
program to mark residents' personal property.
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Four areas participated in the program and the fifth area was used as a control 
group. "The areas were racially mixed, low-to middle-income neighborhoods, containing 
an average of 5,000 persons residing in approximately 2,300 housing units. Each area 
was roughly one square mile in size" (Brown and Wycoff, 1987:79).
The study used an experimental design for the victim recontact and newsletter 
programs. Half of the victims were randomly chosen to receive the victim recontact 
strategy and half did not. Data for this strategy was collected at the end of the test period. 
To test experimentally the impact of giving accurate crime data about the neighborhood 
on residents' fear, 660 addresses were randomly selected in one neighborhood. A news­
letter containing an insert with information on crimes that had occurred in the areas 
during the previous month was sent to 220 households. Another group of 220 households 
received the newsletter without the crime data, and the last group of 220 didn't receive a 
newsletter. This survey data was collected before and after the program.
A quasi-experimental design was used to compare changes over time in the 
treatment areas with the control area for the citizen contact patrol program, storefront, and 
the community organization program. The data for these strategies was collected by 
surveys before the programs were started and at the end of the program periods.
In the quasi-experimental evaluations they used a cross-sectional sample in which 
individuals were interviewed once (either before or after the program was initiated); and a 
panel sample where individuals were interviewed both before and after the strategy was 
implemented.
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The study found no statistically significant differences in the panel or cross- 
section analysis for the victim recontact program and the newsletter. The other three 
programs had mixed results.
The cross-sectional results of the citizen contact patrol program and police 
storefront produced a significant decrease in citizens' perceptions for: fear of personal 
victimization, the level of personal and property crime, and social disorder. Additionally, 
the citizen contact patrol program resulted in a significant increase in satisfaction with the 
area. The community organization program decreased significantly the perceptions of 
social disorder and increased the evaluation of the police. *
In the panel analysis, the citizen contact patrol program had significant reductions 
in perceptions of area social disorder, greater satisfaction with the area as a place to live, 
and improvements in the evaluation of the police. The storefront significantly reduced 
fear of personal victimization and residents' perceptions of personal crime only. The 
panel analysis of the community organization program produced four significant 
differences. "Respondents in the program area had lowered perceptions of personal and 
property crime and social disorder in the area, and also reported higher evaluations of the 
police" (Brown and Wycoff, 1987:85).
A fear reduction quasi-experiment was conducted in Britain to replicate the 
citizen contact patrol programs that were considered successful in Newark and Houston 
(Bennett, 1991). A pre/post-test design was used to survey respondents before and one 
year after they implemented elements in the program. One element was the continuous
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presence of an officer in the experimental area for two of the daytime shifts. The other 
element was resident contacts. Here the police contacted one adult in each household 
during the one-year evaluation period, During these contacts the officer asked the 
resident if they had any crime problems or quality of life issues that the police could help 
them with. The West Midlands Police Department, which serves Birmingham, and the 
Metropolitan Police Department, which serves London, participated in this study. The 
first survey was conducted in June and July 1987. The second survey was conducted in 
August and September 1988.
Among the items Bennett evaluated were fear of crime, satisfaction with the 
police, and victimization rates. For fear of crime, he reported "reductions in worry about 
victimization and improvements in perceptions of personal safety in both" (1991:7) 
experimental areas. However, in Birmingham the control area also had improvements in 
all four of the items measured under the fear of crime category; while in London the 
control area showed an improvement in one of the four items in this category. Because 
there were no significant differences between the control and experimental groups, 
Bennett concluded that the resident contact patrol program did not have an impact on fear 
o f crime. As for satisfaction with the police, improvements occurred in both the 
experimental and control areas. However, the improvement was significantly greater in 
the experimental areas. For the victimization rates, Bennett found no significant 
difference between the experimental and control group areas.
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In 1983, Reiss (1985) conducted a study in a portion of Oakland, California's
Central Business District (CBD) that was a "hot spot" for crime. The crime rate in this
area had been rising over the years and so had the fear among people that went into this
area. Soft-crime was another source of fear, and Reiss said it included:
. . . verbal and physical harassment, behavior offensive to private morals 
such as lewd and lascivious conduct, blaring sounds, panhandling, 
jostling, chronic loitering, littering, bizarre and frightening behavior, 
soliciting or importuning, and public behavior disclosing the use or 
influence of alcohol and drugs (1985:6).
Oakland implemented a diversified patrol strategy using foot patrol, mounted patrol,
Cushman small vehicle patrols, a motorcycle patrol, and a car patrol. Also established
was a Report Incidents Directly program in which people could fill out a postcard sized
incident report on "any irritating or disruptive behavior" (Reiss, 1985:22) and give it to
the police. The focus was on soft-crime and "untended" behavior (Greene and
Mastrofski, 1988).
Reiss evaluated the results by comparing changes in crime rates for the central 
district with rates from the entire city. Since the program started in early 1982, his base 
rate was for 1981 and he used crime data from 1982 and 1983 to compare differences.
The study showed a drop in the rate of personal and property crimes in the CBD, and 
these decreases were greater than the declines city-wide. But when Greene and Taylor (in 
Greene and Mastrofski, 1988) re-examined the data they questioned the findings because 
there were no statistical tests reported.
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The police department in Reno, Nevada implemented a concept called 
"Community Oriented Policing-Plus" in June 1987. It was evaluated using a longitudinal 
survey research method (Bradshaw, Peak, and Glensor, 1990 and 1997), There were five 
telephone surveys conducted (June 1987, March 1988, November 1988, March 1989, and 
April 1990) in which respondents were asked a number of questions including their 
perception of the Reno Police Department's image and overall performance, and if Reno 
was a safe place to live. Part I offenses reported to the police were also examined.
Statistically significant increases were noted for citizens' perceptions of the police 
department's image and performance. In June 1987, 31.6 percent said the department had 
a "good" or "very good" image. By April 1990, it increased to 56.5 percent. In June 
1987, 49.1 percent rated the department's performance "good" or "very good." This 
number improved to 73.8 percent in April 1990. There was also a significant increase in 
respondents who felt Reno was a safer place to live. For the reported Part 1 offenses, the 
numbers increased over the evaluation period. The authors felt this increase could have 
occurred because more land was annexed and the population grew.
The Madison, Wisconsin Police Department implemented an Experimental Police 
District (EPD) in one of their six districts in April 1988. The EPD was part of a "Quality 
Policing" concept that used community policing and problem-solving policing.
The Quality/Productivity management philosophy emphasizes the 
importance of knowing the needs and preferences of the customer, the 
analysis of systems to improve processes and products, the involvement of 
employees in decisions about how to improve systems, and the use of 
quantitative data for organizational decision-making (Wycoff and Skogan,
1993:9).
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Wycoff and Skogan (1993) evaluated citizens' perceptions using a quasi- 
experimental design. A random sample of Madison residents were surveyed before and 
two years after the EPD started. The first survey was conducted in February and March 
1988, just before the EPD station was opened, and the second survey was conducted in 
February and March 1990. They analyzed differences in the residents' attitudes in the 
EPD and Non-EPD areas over time; along with differences in attitudes between the EPD 
and the Non-EPD area.
The general finding was that there was a reduction in citizens' perceptions that 
crime was a problem in the EPD area. When asked if certain types of problems were 
"somewhat big" or "big", significant decreases in robbery and burglary were reported in 
the EPD area; while significant increase occurred over time in the Non-EPD area. When 
compared across the groups, the only significant difference between the two areas was for 
robbery. One interesting finding was the ineffectiveness of the EPD on drug use and the 
sale of drugs. The EPD area had a six percent increase in residents who felt drug use and 
sales by adults and juveniles were big problems. In the Non-EPD area, there was no 
change for drug use and sales by adults, and a two percent decrease for juveniles. The 
difference between these two areas was significant. All of the respondents were also 
asked questions about the EPD area, which had historically been known as an unsafe part 
of town. "Residents served by the EPD were significantly less likely than Non-EPD 
respondents to feel that disorder and crime were serious problems in their areas" (Wycoff 
and Skogan, 1993:74).
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The residents were also asked if they were a victim of robbery, burglary or 
vandalism to their home in the last year. The EPD area reported a slight decrease in 
robbery and vandalism, while the Non-EPD area reported no change for robbery and a 
slight decrease in vandalism. For burglary, there was a significant difference as the EPD 
area had no change and the Non-EPD area had an increase. Additionally, residents were 
asked if they knew anyone victimized from burglary or attempted burglary during the last 
year. The EPD area showed a slight but significant decline and the Non-EPD area 
showed a slight but insignificant increase. The difference between the two areas was not 
significant.
Respondents were asked about fear and worry of personal victimization. All 
residents showed slightly less worry over time, but no statistical differences were found 
between the EPD and Non-EPD area. For worry about property crime, the Non-EPD area 
had increases in all three categories and the EPD area had increases except in one 
category. Again, there was no significant difference between the two areas.
Satisfaction with the police was also evaluated. When they asked residents about 
citizen-initiated contact with the police, the EPD area was less satisfied with the officers' 
behavior over time and the Non-EPD area had no change. The opposite was true for 
officer-initiated contacts. The EPD areas improved while the Non-EPD area showed 
more dissatisfaction. No statistically significant differences were found within the groups 
over time and they did not run a statistical test between the two groups.
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The authors point out that some of the findings from the citizen surveys did not 
produce as many positive results for community policing as expected. They felt that one 
of the reasons could have been that "community policing began to emerge late in the test 
period" (Wycoff and Skogan, 1993:82).
In Baltimore County, they developed a unique program called the Baltimore 
County's Citizen-Oriented Police Enforcement (COPE) program. As part of this 
program, they implemented the Community Foot Patrol Officer (CFPO) program. The 
COPE program used problem-oriented policing to identify and reduce citizens' fear of 
crime.
Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux said the police department stressed that the CFPOs 
were officers who walked the beat, identified problems, interacted with the residents, and 
developed solutions to problems using "resources from both inside and outside the 
department" (1990:184).
The program was evaluated using pre/post test research design. They measured 
citizens' fear of crime, citizens' awareness of COPE officer in the area, and satisfaction 
with the police services. In the 24 COPE neighborhoods door-to-door surveys were 
conducted by the researchers and the COPE officers (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988). 
Additionally, there was in independent assessment to evaluate changes in reported 
crimes. The program was evaluated by Dr. Gary Cordner at the University of Baltimore. 
He concluded:
. . . COPE reduced fear by 19% in target communities, crime by 12% . . .
Community awareness of police presence and satisfaction with police
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service rose 20% and 16%, respectively, a fact attributed to COPE's highly 
visible nature and its emphasis on creating positive interaction with 
citizens (Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990:390).
The program was also evaluated in three stages. Fear of crime declined through
each stage; reported crime initially increased and then dropped; and awareness of the
police presence increased steadily throughout the program.
Citizen satisfaction with police services generally declined from stage one 
to stage two of the program (directed patrol to crime prevention), and then 
increased during stage three (problem-solving). Nonetheless, citizen 
satisfaction with police services was found to be high during all three 
stages of the program (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988:215).
This study also had problems that affect the validity of the findings. Greene and
Taylor (Greene and Mastrofski, 1988) said there were no tests for statistical significance
and the design of the study was pre/post and did not have a control or comparison group
to evaluate the results with.
Conclusion
These evaluations have shown that the positive effects of COP were mixed and 
differed from study to study. In fact, some of the studies had completely different 
findings even when they evaluated the same variables. Although this makes it hard to 
conclude if a hypothesis has been proven, some general conclusion can be drawn.
First is the issue of COP as an effective philosophy to reduce crime. From the 
studies I presented, it appears that crime was not reduced. No significant differences 
were found in the Cincinnati team policing experiment, the foot patrol experiments in 
Newark and Boston, and the studies in Britain and Reno. In Baltimore, there were some
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significant reductions. However, some of the positive results were diluted when the foot 
patrol and ombudsman areas were evaluated separately and the same crimes increased in 
one area and decreased in the other. Burglary and robbery went up in Flint, but no 
statistical tests were conducted on the other crimes that were reported to have decreased. 
Oakland and Baltimore County reported that crime went down, but the results were also 
questionable because no statistical tests were conducted.
There were some positive findings that support the two hypotheses that COP will 
reduce citizens' perceptions of crime and social disorder. In Baltimore, the ombudsman 
areas had significant decreases in the perception of social disorder, but the foot patrol 
areas had significant increases. In this study, perceptions of reduced crime were mixed. 
Results in Madison, along with the Houston and Newark fear-reduction studies also 
found some significant differences that support both hypotheses.
With regard to fear of crime, the findings were not consistent across studies, but 
COP appears to be effective in many instances. In the first Newark experiment, fear of 
crime went down when foot patrols were added. In the second Newark experiment and in 
Houston, there is again evidence to support community oriented policing. On the 
opposing side of this argument, fear increased in Baltimore and no significant differences 
were found between the experimental and control groups in Britain and Madison. In Flint 
and Baltimore County, fear went down but there were no test of statistical significance.
An overwhelming finding from these studies is that COP increases citizens' 
satisfaction and approval of the police. The team policing experiment in Cincinnati was
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the only study that did not produce a change in satisfaction with the police. The foot 
patrol study in Newark showed improvements in police performance, and the ombudsman 
areas in Baltimore had significant improvements for police effectiveness. For the 
Newark fear-reduction studies, evaluations of the police increased in both the cross 
section and panel analysis of the coordinated community policing strategy. In Houston, 
the community organization strategy also had significant increases in both cross sectional 
and panel analysis. This increase also occurred in the panel analysis of the citizen contact 
patrol program. Significant increases with police satisfaction were reported in Britain, 
and in Reno the image and performance of the police also increased significantly. When 
the police initiated contact in Madison, citizens' satisfaction with them increased, but it 
wasn't significant. Finally, in Baltimore County, police satisfaction increased but there 
were no statistical test.
As more studies are conducted, we may be able to arrive at better conclusions of 
COP's effectiveness. In the final chapter of this paper, I will evaluate Omaha's COP 
efforts adding to the growing body of research on this subject. But first I need to talk 
about community oriented policing in Omaha. The next chapter covers this subject.
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CHAPTER 3
COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING IN OMAHA
The Omaha Police Department is currently in the process of implementing 
community oriented policing department-wide. Citizens, elected officials, and officers 
from all branches of the police department are involved in this endeavor. Omaha has 
implemented some COP strategies in the past, but nothing of this magnitude. This 
section will describe what the OPD has done in the past and what they are currently doing 
to implement COP department and city-wide.
One of Omaha's first efforts was District Awareness - Community Oriented 
Policing Via Performance. The Omaha World-Herald reported that this program "urged 
officers to step out of their cruisers and meet with residents, business owners and 
neighborhood groups to discover their daily difficulties" (April 10, 1994:6). This 
program started in 1982 and quickly disappeared.
In early 1989, the Mayor decided to place fifteen officers into the city's five low- 
income housing developments to address the crime problems. These areas were "hot 
spots" for crime, gang activity, and drug traffic. "Shootings occurred nightly. Innocent 
residents fell victim to gang retaliation. Fear dominated the lives of the tenants o f the 
brick buildings, then serving as bunkers, known as the 'projects"' (Dinsmoor, 
Unpublished:i). The developments were run by The Omaha Housing Authority (O.H.A.)
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and included the Southside Terrace, Hilltop, Spencer, Pleasantview, and Logan 
Fontenelle.
According to Major Jack O'Donnell, of the Omaha Police Department, each shift 
had two officers who walked the streets and one back-up officer in a patrol car that served 
as a "paddy wagon." Because the assignment was dangerous and undesirable, officers 
were assigned to these housing developments in reverse seniority. There was "very little 
focus or direction" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished: 1) because the officers had different 
supervisors. Major O'Donnell said that this approach didn't solve any of the problems in 
the housing areas.
In 1990, Jack O'Donnell was in charge of the North Sector for the Omaha Police 
Department. He realized that these housing developments were a haven for crime and the 
police were receiving many calls for service there. He felt community policing was one 
way to stop this, but realized that the police department alone couldn't change the area. 
The O.H.A. also realized that their efforts alone were not enough to eliminate the drug 
and gang problems in the housing developments, even though they were nationally 
known for their efforts.
So on June 28, 1990, Jack O'Donnell and other command officers from the OPD's 
North Sector met with Mr. Robert Armstrong, the Executive Director of the O.H.A., and 
his staff to discuss police protection in the housing developments. What emerged was a 
partnership between the police and the O.H.A. that would benefit both agencies. The 
OPD had no money in its budget to effectively attack the enormous crime problems in
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these housing developments, but grant money was available to the O.H.A. to help the 
police fight the crime, drug, and gang problems plaguing these housing developments. 
Also, by exchanging information, the police and the O.H.A. could identify trouble­
makers and address concerns to improve residents’ safety. This partnership "was 
committed to improving the quality of life of O.H.A. residents by making the housing 
developments a safer place to live" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished.T). During this meeting, the 
O.H.A. supervisors brought maps of their housing developments showing the trouble 
spots and the trouble units.
In a June 29, 1990, memo to Deputy Chief Circo, Jack O'Donnell stated:
The purpose of the meeting was to give a brief overview of a new 
approach to reducing the fear of crime and apprehending criminals in the 
City of Omaha. It was explained to everyone at the meeting that the nine 
officers currently assigned to the beat patrol in the housing developments 
will be involved in Community Problem Solving Policing. All the nine 
current beat officers will be placed under the direct supervision of 
Sergeant Dan Heidelberg who will report directly to Lieutenant Joseph 
Davitt. The nine officers and Sergeant Heidelberg will work directly with 
each housing development to identify problems and work with the housing 
development community to apprehend those individuals involved in any 
type of illegal activity.
In the days following the meeting, Sergeant Heidelberg met with the O.H.A. 
Sector Supervisors responsible for each of the housing developments. During these 
meetings, key information concerning crime areas, troublemakers, gang leaders, license 
numbers, vehicle descriptions, escape routes, and tactics used by drug dealers were given 
to him.
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Selective Patrol Unit 
As part of this new partnership, the OPD officially created the Selective Patrol 
Unit (S.P.U.) on July 15, 1990. The O.H.A. provided space in one of their Hilltop 
Housing Development buildings for the unit’s headquarters. They also offered the S.P.U. 
“. . . full and complete cooperation of all staff members, executive, supervisory and 
support. It also committed to follow-up with residents, using information supplied by 
S.P.U. officers, and employ all available options to address a problem, up to and 
including eviction” (Dinsmoor, Unpublished: 1-2).
In November 1990, the O.H.A. received a grant from the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development. The O.H.A. used $232,000 of the $250,000 grant to pay the 
salaries of six more officers to patrol the housing developments. The additional officers 
brought the total to 18 police officers, 2 sergeants, a lieutenant, and a captain to patrol 
O.H.A.'s five housing developments.
On December 2, 1991, the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
awarded the O.H.A. a $525,400 Public Housing Drug Elimination Program (PHDEP) 
Grant to address the problem of drugs and gang violence in public housing areas. As part 
of this grant, the O.H.A. bought the S.P.U. $100,300 worth of new equipment (25 Saber 
II 48 Channel VHS radios, a Body-Bug system, 2 facsimile machines, a video camera 
with night infrared, and a Saber II charger).
The 17-year-old radios used by the S.P.U. had a history of functioning poorly. 
Whenever the radios were down the officers had to stay in their cruisers for safety
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reasons, unable to walk the housing developments and talk to the residents. The 
unreliability of these radios also prohibited the unit from conducting surveillance 
operations; and they were unable to communicate directly with the Gang, Narcotics, and 
Organized Crime Units.
The new Saber II radios made it possible for the S.P.U. to conduct foot patrols 
and several successful surveillance operations in the housing developments. Each 
channel was secure so police scanners couldn't intercept conversations. The Executive 
Director of the Omaha Housing Authority, his Sector Supervisors, and the O.H.A. Crime 
Line Security Coordinator were also equipped with these radios. This enabled the O.H.A. 
to quickly report crimes to the S.P.U. officers, decreasing response times.
The Body-Bug system provided necessary surveillance equipment. The S.P.U. 
recorded drug transactions and gang activity in and around the housing developments 
using the video camera. The unit was successful arresting drug dealers in numerous 
undercover narcotics sting and surveillance operations using this equipment.
S.P.U.'s Mission, Goal, and Objectives 
The S.P.U. is a specialized unit that patrols the Omaha Housing Authority's low- 
income family housing developments in an effort to make it a safe place to live. In 
keeping with the COP philosophy, the unit adapted community policing and they 
incorporated the problem-solving techniques associated with problem-oriented policing. 
The officers' tasks were to establish one-on-one relationships with the residents, increase
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their trust in the police, and open lines of communications. The unit worked with
residents to identify problems and sought their help to implement solutions.
According to a September 5, 1990, memo by Jack O'Donnell, the goal of the
S.P.U. was "to reduce the fear of crime within the Omaha Housing Authority
Developments." In 1991, Lieutenant Thorson wrote an inner-office memo expanding this
goal "to reduce the fear of crime in areas between and around these developments
because incidents that occur in these areas also directly impact the quality of life within
the housing developments." The Standard Operating Procedures of the S.P.U. states:
The goal is to reduce the incidence of crime in the area and assist the 
residents in taking more responsibility of the area. It is believed that this 
can be accomplished by using several methods. Officers and residents 
must establish a "trust-system" between them. The officers should also be 
prepared to act as a "liaison" officer between the residents and other 
governmental agencies in resolving non-police related problems. Last but 
certainly not least the officers must work with the residents in reducing the 
"fear" o f crime in the housing developments (Omaha Police Department,
1993: Unnumbered).
From the start, a lack of community involvement was a major problem that 
needed to be corrected. Many of the developments' residents would not tell the police 
about criminal activity, and were less than cooperative when the police investigated 
crimes. One Sector Supervisor told Sergeant Heidelberg that many of the tenants were 
afraid to speak up for fear of retaliation from gang members. But, Trojanowicz and 
Bucqueroux (1990) stated when Community Police Officers routinely stop and talk with 
residents on the street, visit them at home, and attend neighborhood meetings, they can 
freely pass on vital information without calling attention to themselves. “It was believed
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that this lack of involvement was rooted in fear, as well as a lack of trust... It was further 
agreed that in order to obtain this involvement from the residents a mutual trust must be 
established between the officers and the residents” (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:2).
Garnering the residents' trust and cooperation would take time. A "trust-system" 
had to be established so the residents' believed the officers wanted to reduce and elimi­
nate crime, drugs, and gangs; and the officers needed to believe the residents shared that 
goal as well. Both proactive and reactive approaches were used to build mutual trust. 
The proactive approach focused on communications and the prevention of problems 
before they took root in the community. The reactive approach dealt with immediate 
problems and the prevention of similar problems from occurring in the future.
This included the strict enforcement of all statutes and ordinances, as well 
as immediate response to calls for service within the developments. What 
distinguished this reactive approach from others, however, was the goal.
Rather than simply "putting out a fire" by responding to situations in the 
housing developments, the officers strove to give the residents a sense of 
being heard and valued. This, it was thought, would eventually lead to the 
establishment of trust. Through this trust, the leap could eventually be 
made from crime detection to crime prevention (Dinsmoor,
Unpublished:2).
The tactics associated with both of these approaches will be described later.
To reduce the fear of crime, the S.P.U.'s primary objectives were to reduce crime, 
drug, and gang activities within the O.H.A. developments and to address problems 
around the developments. Jack O'Donnell wrote in two of his memos that he felt certain 
tasks done by the unit would help reduce the fear of crime: (1) Have the unit members 
meet every person living in the housing developments; (2) Establish a communication
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system with all O.H.A. Management Staff and residents; (3) Develop a positive working 
relationship with the O.H.A. staff; (4) S.P.U. officers attend monthly meetings of the 
Housing Authority Tenants Organization and; (5) Develop communications between 
S.P.U. officers and other officers in the area so they could share information.
When the S.P.U. first started, the officers worked from 1000 hours until 0200 
hours. Two officers work the "B" shift (1000 hours - 1800 hours), and split their time 
between the five developments conducting spot checks. This two-officer patrol also 
conducted administrative tasks such as delivering information exchange forms between 
the O.H.A. and the Selective Patrol Unit. Eight officers worked the "C" shift (1800 
hours - 0200 hours), and two-officer teams were placed in each of the following O.H.A. 
developments: Southside Terrace, Spencer, and Logan Fontenelle. They also combined 
the Pleasantview and Hilltop housing areas and used a two-officer unit to cover both.
The hours of operation changed to address various problems in the developments. All of 
the S.P.U. officers worked for one sergeant who reported to the North Sector Lieutenant. 
That lieutenant reported directly to the North Sector Captain.
The officers were to respond to all calls for service within their assigned housing 
development. They would not be diverted to supplement calls or support operations in 
other areas of Omaha unless approved by the S.P.U. sergeant or the North Sector 
Lieutenant. This was done for two reasons. “First, it would insure an immediate 
response to calls for service within the developments. Secondly, it would insure that the 
officers would not be taken away from the developments, and that all of their time and
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effort would be focused there” (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:3-4). By only responding to 
calls in their areas, they would be able to determine first-hand what caused the incident. 
They could then attempt to solve the problem, alleviating further incidents from occurr­
ing. If  the officer was tied up on another response, a non-S.P.U. patrol would take the 
call. Sherman, Milton, and Kelley (1973) found that some of the officers involved in 
team policing disliked other patrols coming into the team's area because they messed up 
all the good things they had done. This was not a big concern with the Selective Patrol 
Unit.
S.P.U. Training
Training for the S.P.U. began immediately. The first training session in July 
1990, involved S.P.U. members, O.H.A. senior staff, and several command officers 
whose areas of responsibility included the housing developments. This training enabled 
the O.H.A. staff and police officers to meet each other. Also during this meeting, the 
police explained their policies and procedures to the O.H.A. staff. In turn, the O.H.A. 
staff provided information about their facilities, their policies, and their procedures to the 
police.
Discussing each other’s policies and procedures was useful to both parties. The 
officers learned ways to channel information to O.H.A. personnel to produce evictions, 
repair lighting, or report other problems that would hinder their work. Tours of each 
O.H.A. housing development were provided to familiarize the officers and the command 
staff with these areas.
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This meeting was also an opportunity for the OPD's North Sector Area 
Supervisors to gain an understanding and suggest how the S.P.U. could work in 
cooperation with their cruiser officers in the housing developments. Their attendance and 
support was critical. Without the North Sector Supervisors’ involvement, their officers 
may have resented the S.P.U., and a united front would not occur.
Community policing and problem-oriented policing were not formally addressed 
at this first session. However, the officers were given literature to read on the 
philosophies. They did discuss what was expected of the officers and the mission, goals, 
and objectives of the Selective Patrol Unit. Brainstorming sessions occurred, allowing 
participants to suggest some solutions to the areas' problems. The officers "came to 
understand that instead of simply making an arrest and ending a situation for the moment, 
they would become involved in defining and analyzing problems, developing solutions 
and selecting and implementing the best possible solutions" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:2).
On August 6, 1990, there was a second meeting between the OPD and the O.H.A 
staff. The purpose of the meeting was to evaluate the effectiveness of the S.P.U. during 
the first weeks of operation. Sergeant Heidelberg reported the unit was responsible for 
the arrest of ninety people on 113 charges (36 traffic, 22 warrants, 48 misdemeanors, and 
7 felonies). One of the arrests was an individual called the "Beast." He was a Blood 
gang member and instigator of gang activity in the Southside Terrace Homes. During 
this meeting an O.H.A. Sector Supervisor stated he had been getting more cooperation 
from the residents, especially on narcotics information. They also discussed plans to add
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more foot patrol operations, targeting main offenders, and the surveillance of narcotics 
activities.
Meetings between these two organizations occurred every six months to discuss 
and analyze problems, brainstorm possible solutions, share information, and evaluate the 
effectiveness of the Selective Patrol Unit. Additionally, the S.P.U. conducted periodic in- 
service training to increase members' effectiveness within the housing developments.
On March 5, 1991, the S.P.U. conducted a two hour in-service training session on 
field observation cards, special operations, search warrants, surveillances, foot patrols, 
ban and bar letters, trespassing and loitering problems, O.H.A. tenant rules, O.H.A. 
information exchanges, and there was a discussion on curfews. In February 1992, the 
Narcotics Unit trained the S.P.U. on the use of confidential informants, evidence 
handling, and undercover procedures.
As the bonds and partnership grew stronger with the O.H.A. and its residents, the 
S.P.U. began to tackle the problems that plagued the housing developments. Community 
and problem-oriented policing elements inherent in COP were supplemented by 
traditional police tactics; as both proactive and reactive approaches were used to establish 
relationships and increase trust between residents and police.
Proactive Approach And Operations
The proactive approaches were designed to facilitate communications and prevent 
problems. They included foot patrols, bicycle patrols, an exchange form, attendance at 
tenant meetings, a ride-along program, Operation "Officer Friendly", youth
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"Ovemighters", a victim/witness support program, early intervention programs, a referral 
program, a Police Athletic League, and an OPD Buddy Program.
Foot patrols provided an accessibility that wasn't possible with the police 
patrolling the areas in vehicles. By meeting face-to-face, officers and residents got to 
know each other, barriers came down, and communications improved. The idea was that 
informal conversations would lead to discussions regarding the areas' problems.
In November 1990, the S.P.U. conducted a door-to-door survey to see if residents 
had any problems or complaints. During this survey, residents had positive comments 
about the foot patrols. Some residents said they noticed an improvement in the gang and 
crime situations over 1989.
With the assistance from some local bike enthusiasts, the S.P.U. started a bicycle 
patrol in April 1992. The bike was simply an icebreaking tool for the S.P.U. to increase 
interactions with the residents by making them more approachable. "Due to the built-in 
topic of conversation, the bike, many communication barriers were destroyed and replac­
ed with friendly relationships" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:5). Foot patrols were effective in 
accomplishing this, and they thought officers on bikes could be just as effective.
A bike offers some advantages over foot patrol or vehicle patrol. Officers on 
bikes can respond much faster than on foot, and the bikes can go places vehicles can't.
The bike can also be used to pursue suspects much quicker than an officer on foot.
Finally, an officer on a bike provides an element of surprise. Because of their speed, 
mobility, and stealthiness, a bike patrol officer can appear quickly from almost anywhere,
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catching suspects off-guard. The bicycle patrol was a very effective enforcement tool. 
During its first nine months the bike patrol was involved with 259 arrests (Dinsmoor, 
Unpublished:?).
The officers were required to perform either foot patrol of bicycle patrol in the 
housing developments at least two hours per shift. The tactic they used was their choice.
Special events were another way to build rapport with inner-city residents. The 
S.P.U. met residents at an annual celebration known as AUGUSTFEST. The theme of 
this annual event, which started in 1990, was "to encourage youngsters to return to the 
classroom . . . and to stress the importance of attaining an education" (Dinsmoor, 
Unpublished:4). In addition to providing security for the event, the S.P.U. also hosted a 
bike rodeo.
Soon after the S.P.U. established its bike patrol, they started sponsoring bike 
rodeos in the low-income housing developments. "These rodeos were used as an avenue 
to impart bicycle safety to the youth of the developments, as well as offer another 
opportunity for residents to interact with officers on a personal level" (Dinsmoor, 
Unpublished:5). During these events, door prizes and bike flags were given away, and 
bikes were repaired free of charge by officers and local bike shops. The bike patrol also 
spoke to Girl Scouts and Boy Scouts.
In October 1990, the S.P.U. officers were involved in a Halloween "Officer 
Friendly" Operation. The officers passed out bags filled with candy that was supplied by 
the O.H.A. to about 250 children. During this giveaway, information was received by
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one of the officers about a person with a gun. The individual was found and arrested.
The officers then remained on foot in the developments so the children could trick or treat 
safely.
Two other programs proposed by O.H.A. as part of a $525,400 PHDEP grant 
were the Police Athletic League and the OPD Buddy Program. The Police Athletic 
League targeted youth likely to become involved in gangs and drugs. It was a 
collaborative effort between the Omaha Public School System, the OPD, and the O.H.A. 
The Police Athletic League provided an opportunity for the youth to participate in 
constructive activities instead of gangs and drugs. It also strengthened trust and a 
cooperative spirit between the police and the at-risk youth. The league provided officers 
with an opportunity to get to know the kids in an environment other than on patrol. This 
program was not limited to public housing youth, although the vast majority of the 
participants were from the low-income housing developments. The officers acted as 
coaches, teammates and advisors.
The OPD Buddy Program paired an officer with two youth between the age of 
eight and eighteen. The officer met with their buddies and parents twice a week. It 
promoted comradery and built relationships between the youth and the S.P.U. officers 
that patrol the area.
As part of the OPD Buddy Program, the S.P.U. and the O.H.A. staff hosted its 
first "Ovemighter" in March 1991. Sixty-five children, between ten and twelve years old, 
spent the night with the S.P.U. officers and O.H.A. staff members in an O.H.A. facility.
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This facility had a gym, study center, Ping-Pong tables, billiards tables, a big screen 
television, and a lunchroom. During the twenty-two hours, the officers, staff, and 
children played sports, games, and watched television and videos. They also discussed 
the dangers of drugs and gangs; and learned about self-esteem, choices and 
responsibilities. "This activity served to, once again, break down barriers, foster 
relationships and build trust between officers and resident youth" (Dinsmoor, 
Unpublished:4-5). This event was so successful that it is repeated every fall and spring.
It has even included junior high/middle school students.
These activities fostered goodwill among the residents, but more action was still 
needed to control problem tenants. The key was communications between the S.P.U. and 
the Omaha Housing Authority. This was accomplished by the creation of the 
"Information Exchange Form." Both the S.P.U. and the O.H.A. staff used this form to 
provide information to the other agency. If people were uncooperative or extremely 
cooperative with the S.P.U., one was sent to the O.H.A. staff. The police also used these 
forms to note arrest, violations of any O.H.A. policies, along with destructive behavior by 
tenants or guests; and sent them to the O.H.A. staff for possible eviction actions against 
the tenant. Eviction would occur if the tenant was involved in any criminal activity away 
from the housing developments, assaulted someone, threatened anybody with a weapon, 
displayed violent behavior, or were involved in illegal drug activity. To do this, S.P.U. 
officers received arrest information and contact reports from other officers in the 
department concerning O.H.A. property or tenants. In addition, this
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. . . form allowed officers to relay information to O.H.A. about litter 
problems, street or side-walk maintenance, street light maintenance, tree 
trimming needs, or any other environmental issues observed during their 
patrol. These issues not only directly affected the quality of life for 
residents, but also had a profound effect, on criminal activity. An area that 
was dimly lit and shrouded by overgrown trees could serve as a prime 
breeding ground for drug dealing and other covert activity (Dinsmoor, 
Unpublished:4).
In exchange, the O.H.A. staff sent the Selective Patrol Unit forms containing information 
received from tenants and other sources about crimes or other illegal activities occurring 
in the housing developments. This information was extremely useful in helping the 
police make arrests and making the area safer.
The unit also started a ride-along program where O.H.A. supervisors rode with 
S.P.U. officers during patrol. This was another approach used to exchange information 
about activities in the low-income housing developments.
To help facilitate the exchange of information between the police and the 
residents, the Selective Patrol Unit officers attended monthly tenant meetings. During 
these meetings the officers listened to the residents' questions, requests for action, and 
comments about the unit's activities. The officers clarified misconceptions and asked for 
the residents' continuing help.
All of this information made arrests possible. To make convictions stick, the 
residents were also needed to testify in court. To ensure that residents made their 
scheduled court appearances, a Victim/Witness Support program was started. The 
O.H.A. staff provided individuals without transportation a ride to and from court. This 
program "served to diminish the occasional problem of lack of cooperation on the part of
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resident witnesses" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:5). It also helped fill the critical need for 
follow through on the part of the residents and for them to take more responsibility for 
the area.
The S.P.U. and the O.H.A. also recognized the need to prevent problems from 
taking root in the community. Their proactive approach led to an Early Intervention 
program and a Referral program. Using the Early Intervention program, officers 
identified tenants who were headed for trouble and informed the O.H.A. staff. The staff 
would contact the individual and offer assistance to help the person solve their problem. 
The officers used the Referral program to get the O.H.A. Gang Intervention staff and 
Drug/Alcohol counselors involved with troubled residents.
Reactive Approach And Operations 
To improve problems that needed immediate attention and prevent them from 
occurring again, the S.P.U. used reactive approaches and operations. One approach was 
to incorporate enforcement tactics used by the Criminal Investigations Bureau. The 
S.P.U. wrote and executed search and felony arrest warrants; and conducted buy/bust, 
surveillance, and reverse sting operations. They also used informants. These operations 
were designed to rid the developments of criminal violators and make the residents feel 
safer. The O.H.A. residents and staff praised these efforts. In fact, most of the 
individuals "arrested in the housing developments for serious crimes were not residents" 
(Dinsmoor, Unpublished:5).
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"Based on input from officers and residents, it was determined that both open-air 
drug dealing and drive-by shootings were facilitated by the existence of relatively short 
thoroughfares through housing developments" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished:5). To correct 
this problem, the Selective Patrol Unit examined traffic patterns. Streets were changed to 
"one way" in the Logan Fontenelle and Spencer Street housing developments. Additional 
stop signs were also put up in the Spencer Street development. In the Hilltop housing 
area, they placed a barricade across a street preventing access to the development from a 
heavily-traveled outside street. These changes were done with the approval of the O.H.A. 
staff.
Another deterrent approach was traffic checkpoints. This tactic was developed as 
a result of both residents' complaints and inputs. The checkpoint plan was coordinated 
and approved by the police department, City Prosecutor, the O.H.A. staff, and officers of 
the tenant organizations. When the checkpoints were in effect, a sign was posted 
notifying drivers that it was in progress. If a driver decided not to enter the housing 
development through the checkpoint they could turn around without being detained by 
the police. When a vehicle entered the checkpoint, the police would ask for a driver's 
license, a vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. If these documents were not in 
order or some other violation was noted, the problem was immediately addressed.
Officers made numerous arrests for possession of drugs and weapons, and flushed out 
individuals with outstanding warrants. This tactic was successful and residents' support 
was great.
75
Ban and Bar letters help prevent problems from recurring. In cooperation with the 
S.P.U., the O.H.A. staff and their attorneys, the City Legal Department, and the 
Prosecutor's Office, the Omaha Police Department added to their Standard Operating 
Procedure Manual instructions on using the O.H.A. Ban and Bar Letters. This Ban and 
Bar Letter incorporated city and state trespass laws to prohibit non-residents involved in 
criminal activity from entering O.H.A. property. After the letter was given to the 
offender, a copy was placed on file with the Selective Patrol Unit. If the individual 
returned, they were prosecuted on criminal trespass charges.
The foot, bicycle, and intensive patrols were also part of the reactive approach.
The intensive patrol technique was used to saturate a particular "problem area with as 
many officers as possible, for a brief period of time" (Dinsmoor, Unpublished: 7). The 
goal o f the intensive patrol was to make the area undesirable to criminals by contacting as 
many residents as possible. This operation was usually done because residents requested 
it.
The S.P.U. developed a relationship with a wide variety of agencies. Within the 
police department, they worked with the Gang, Narcotics, Traffic, Mounted Patrol, and 
the Weed and Seed Units. They exchanged information and worked together to conduct 
investigations, sting operations, and drug raids. Working relationships were also formed 
with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; U.S. Attorney's Office; the Douglas 
County Prosecutor; along with the City Prosecutor and Legal Department. The Omaha
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Public Power District also assisted the unit by replacing street lights within 24 hours of 
being notified.
The Selective Patrol Unit was a separate unit in the police department until March 
7, 1994. At that time it fell under the Weed and Seed program, but still operated in 
Omaha's low-income housing developments.
Expansion of Community Policing in Omaha
The work done by the S.P.U. has been a springboard for the expansion of 
community policing in Omaha. On November 9, 1992, Mary McPherson from the San 
Diego Police Department provided training on problem-oriented policing to 200 Omaha 
officers including the Selective Patrol Unit. Between April and December 1993, the 
department trained 122 officers from the Northeast Precinct in community policing and 
the problem solving model. Additionally, the Omaha Police Department has expanded 
the Bicycle Patrol into all four precincts of the city. Community policing was also used 
in the Benson public housing areas and the north Omaha Fairfax neighborhoods as the 
Weed and Seed program expanded.
The city-wide implementation of community oriented policing started in 
December 1993, when a group of ten representatives traveled to Portland, Oregon to 
obtain information to help develop Omaha's COP plan. The ten members of this group 
consisted of representatives of the police department, city government, consultants, and a 
member of a local Neighborhood Association.
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Following this trip, it was determined that a strategic plan would be put together 
to implement community oriented policing for the entire city of Omaha. In January 1994, 
the strategic planning process was briefed to the senior staff of the Omaha Police 
Department. On February 3, 1994, the proposed Strategic Plan was presented to the 
Mayor's staff for preliminary approval. The Mayor's office gave approval to develop the 
strategic plan on February 25, 1994. Three days later the police department created its 
Community Policing Support Unit to develop the plan. This unit was composed of a 
lieutenant, a sergeant, three officers, and a secretary. Omaha Police Chief James Skinner 
and Mayor P.J. Morgan outlined the strategic planning process during a news conference 
in late March 1994.
This effort incorporated inputs from the entire city as well as from the police 
officers and employees. Eight public meetings were conducted in April 1994 to obtain 
inputs from the community. During these meetings, police explained the community 
policing philosophy and the planning process that was going to take place. Individuals 
attending the meetings also filled out questionnaires addressing problems in their 
neighborhoods and how they felt the police should respond to them. Overall, there were 
524 police employee one-on-one interviews, 224 community surveys, and 165 outside 
agency surveys conducted.
As part of the plan, a thirty-five-member Chiefs Steering Committee was formed. 
This committee wrote the police department's mission statement, defined policing for 
Omaha, and set goals that would be used to develop the plan. This committee was
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composed of fourteen police officers, eighteen citizens, two of the Mayor's aides, and was 
led by a consultant. The Mayor, City Council, and the Police Chief selected the citizens 
who participated on the committee,
The Community Policing Support Unit hosted the first meeting of the Chiefs 
Steering Committee on May 4, 1994. This committee then met at Creighton University 
on May 19 and 20 to lay the foundation for Omaha's community oriented policing 
philosophy.
The mission statement this group wrote said: "Omaha's Police Department, in
partnership with our community, is dedicated to equitably serve and protect, with respect
and dignity, all individuals" (Omaha Police Department, 1995:9). They defined policing
in Omaha as: "a philosophy of interdependent shared responsibility, a partnership within
our community — police and citizens -- in developing proactive community-based
strategies to make Omaha and its neighborhoods safe, vital, and healthy" (Omaha Police
Department, 1995:10). The committee also developed four goals:
GOAL 1: Strengthen Community Empowerment and Support:
Create a more involved, responsible community by building stronger 
partnerships, improving customer service, providing more open and 
responsive communications, and delivering programs that promote 
involvement in problem solving, crime prevention, and education.
GOAL 2: Develop and Empower Personnel:
Develop training, management, and organizational approaches that are 
consistent with the Mission and policing philosophy of the Omaha Police 
Department; assure that the recruiting and hiring philosophy and practices 
are consistent with the characteristics and needs of our community; 
provide a work environment that supports customer service, personal 
responsibility and accountability, and fosters a teamwork attitude.
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GOAL 3: Reduce Crime and Fear of Crime:
Identify and implement strategies to reduce crime and fear of crime and 
improve the safety and the quality of life of citizens of Omaha.
GOAL 4: Strengthen Fiscal Support and Improve Planning and 
Evaluation:
Seek and promote, through a partnership with the community, increased 
financial support for the Omaha Police Department to make upgrades 
consist-ent with ongoing goals and objectives. Develop efficient and 
effective management strategies that will support quality short and long 
range planning, budgeting, fiscal management, and project evaluations 
(Omaha Police Department, 1995:21-24).
Eight separate planning teams composed of 67 police employees and 109 Omaha 
residents were also developed. They looked at each of the police department's bureaus to 
see how each one could better conform with the mission statement and goals established 
by the Chiefs Steering Committee. These planning teams developed action plans for 
each bureau that were included in the strategic plan.
In October 1994, the planning teams completed 137 action plans that correspond­
ed with the goals established by the Chiefs Steering Committee. The strategic plan was 
presented to the Mayor for approval in February 1995.
Training and information on community oriented policing and updates on the 
strategic plan occurred during the months of June through October. The police recruit 
class was given one-day training on community policing and the police were apprised of 
the plan's progress. Also during this time period, community policing presentations were 
given to numerous community groups. These presentations continued throughout 1994.
The Omaha Police Department is now in the process of implementing the 
strategic plan. The action plans developed by the planning teams have been formalized.
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Priorities have been established and timelines have been determined to implement each of 
the action plans. These items have also been projected into the budget through the year 
1999. At this point in time, it appears that the Omaha Police Department is well on its 
way in establishing its form of community oriented policing for the city of Omaha, 
Nebraska.
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CHAPTER 4
EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY OR TENTED POLICING IN OMAHA
The study of community oriented policing continues as researchers determine if it 
is successful and goals are achieved. In the second chapter of this paper, each of the 
studies either had successes or failures that adds to the growing amount of evidence. My 
research question focuses on Omaha, Nebraska. Will Omaha have some of the same 
successes or failures noted in the other COP studies? My prediction is that because COP 
was being implemented in the city, some of the same successes noted in these past studies 
will also occur in Omaha.
Hypotheses To Test
To test this prediction, four hypotheses will be evaluated in this paper. Because 
community oriented policing was gradually being implemented, the data that coincides 
with each hypothesis can be studied for changes that occur over time. The first 
hypothesis is that crime will decrease over time in Omaha as COP is implemented. The 
second hypothesis is that as COP is implemented, citizens will perceive crime as less of a 
problem. My third hypothesis is that fear of crime will decrease with the implementation 
of COP. The last hypothesis is that citizens' quality of interaction with the officers of the 
Omaha Police Department will show improvements over time as COP is being 
implemented.
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Research Design and Methodology 
Survey
Omaha Conditions Surveys were conducted in the city of Omaha and the 
surrounding counties in 1990, 1991, 1993, and 1994. Two different surveys 
(Metropolitan and North Omaha) were conducted from 1990 to 1993. In 1994, only the 
Metropolitan survey was conducted. These surveys asked a number of questions about 
the Omaha area and are a good tool to measure COP's effectiveness in Omaha.
Each of the Metropolitan surveys conducted random telephone interviews of 
adults 18 years or older in the Omaha metropolitan area. The person interviewed was the 
one who would have the next birthday in the household. The random telephone numbers 
in 1990 and 1991 were obtained from independent firms and given to the Center for 
Public Affairs Research. In 1990, the last digit of each telephone number was dropped 
and replaced with a random number ranging from zero to nine. This procedure ensured 
that households with unlisted telephone numbers had an equal chance of being surveyed. 
In 1991, they sorted the 8,000 telephone numbers provided to them on the fifth digit. For 
the 1993 and 1994 surveys, they used a modified random digit dialing design to include 
unlisted telephone numbers in the sample.
The first Metropolitan survey contained 779 cases and was conducted between 
January 11-29, 1990. The 1991 survey contained 632 adults interviewed from February 
20 to March 9. This sample also included twenty-four randomly selected individuals 
from the North Omaha sample, and seven randomly selected individuals from a separate 
Hispanic sample. In 1993, 802 respondents were interviewed from June 24 to July 19. 
Finally, the 1994 survey occurred between October 10 and November 11. It contained 
800 respondents.
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In addition to the Metropolitan surveys, there were separate random interviews of 
minority households in several census tracts in North Omaha. These surveys used the 
same interview protocol as the Metropolitan surveys. The random sample was selected 
using actual telephone numbers known to be within the targeted areas. The problem with 
this method was that it excluded unlisted telephone numbers.
There were 200 cases in the 1990 and 1991 North Omaha surveys, and 575 in
1993. Interviews for the first North Omaha survey were conducted from January 30 to 
February 5, 1990. In 1991, the interviews occurred from March 14-19; and the final 
survey was from August 12-24, 1993. Census tracts 7 through 12 and 59.02 were used in 
1990 and 1991 because the latest census indicated they had a minority population of at 
least 85 percent. In 1993, the number of census tracts increased to seventeen because 
they used areas where the black population was 40 percent or higher according to the 
1990 Census. This increase in census tracts will affect the composition of my sample. I 
will explain how I handled this problem in the section titled "North Omaha Sample."
For each of the surveys, the Center for Public Affairs Research found that the 
overall demographic characteristics of survey respondents closely resembled the popula­
tion of the area. In the 1991 Metropolitan sample, some differences were noted as 
minorities and males were under-represented. Also in both the 1993 Metropolitan and 
North Omaha surveys and the 1994 Metropolitan survey there were slight under­
representations in the lowest income category and over-representations in the highest 
income category.
Metropolitan Sample 
Respondents who lived in and around the city of Omaha were included in all of 
the Metropolitan surveys. Because I want to look at the effects of COP as it is being
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TABLE I.— METROPOLITAN SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS
Year 1990
(%)
1991
(%)
1993
(%)
1994
(%)
A. Sample Size 433 401 489 494
B. Age
18-34 36.5 25. 9 40.1 37 . 7
(158) (104) (196) (186)
35-64 43 39.9 42 .1 43.1
(186) (160) (206) (213)
65 + 20.1 19.2 17 . 2 18 .2
(87) (77) (84) (90)
UNK . 5 15 . 6 1
(2) (60) (3) (5)
C. Ethnic/Race
White 85.2 86.5 89.4 87.2
(369) (347) (437) (431)
Black 11.5 9.5 8 . 4 8.3
(50) (38) (41) (41)
Asian . 9 .2 1
(4) (1) (5)
American Indian . 7 .2 . 2 . 6
(3) (1) (1) (3)
Hispanic 1.4 2.5 1.2 2
(6) (10) (6) (10)
Other or Unknown .2 . 9 .8 . 8
(1) (4) (4) (4)
D. Income
$0-9,999 10.4 13 8.2 5.7
(45) (52) (40) (28)
$10-24,999 34 22. 9 21. 3 23.5
(147) (92) (104) (116)
$25-49,999 36 35.7 41.4 37 . 7
(156) (143) (201) (186)
$50,000+ 8 . 5 14 .2 21.3 22. 9
(37) (57) (104) (113)
UNK 11 14 .2 8.2 10.3
(48) (57) (40) (51)
E. Gender*
Male 43.4 37 . 9 48.3 47
(188) (152) (236) (232)
Female 56.6 61. 8 51. 7 53
(245) (248) (253) (262)
NOTE: Figures in parentheses are numbers of respondents.
* The sex of one respondent in 1991 was Unknown (.2%) .
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implemented in Omaha, I reduced my sample size to include only Omaha residents.
Table I contains this sample and its demographic characteristics. The 1990 sample was 
reduced to 433 people who lived in the Omaha Public School District. For 1991, there 
were 401 respondents who lived in the city of Omaha. In 1993, 489 people lived in the 
Omaha city limits; and in 1994 there were 494 people living in the Omaha city limits.
North Omaha Sample 
My second sample group will represent individuals who live in or around the 
O.H.A. low-income housing developments where the S.P.U. operated. Street addresses 
were not recorded during the surveys so I couldn’t determine if a particular respondent 
lived in or near the developments. I contacted the O.H.A. and learned that their housing 
developments were in zip codes 68102, 68107, 68110, and 68111; and the average 
resident's income was under $23,000 per year.
With this information, I decided my O.H.A. sample would consist of respondents 
who lived in the O.H.A. zip codes areas and had an income below $10,000. Although 
this is not exact, I believe that my sample closely reflects those individuals who live in or 
around these developments. The goal of the S.P.U. was to improve conditions inside the 
housing developments and the areas bordering them. With this in mind, attitudes of 
individuals inside and surrounding the developments should be similar. Because there 
was only a small number of individuals in the Metropolitan surveys who lived in the 
O.H.A. zip code areas and earned under $10,000 per year, my sample came from the 
North Omaha surveys. The demographics are in Table II. In 1990, my sample size was 
fifty-one and in 1991, fifty-four individuals met my criteria.
In 1993, the survey area expanded and contained more census tracts. To remain 
consistent, and use the same geographic area so comparisons could be made over time, I
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TABLE II.— O.H.A. SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHICS
Year 1990 1991 1993
(%) (%) (%)
A. Sample Size 51 54 54
B. Age
18-34 31.4 24 .1 59.3
(16) (13) (32)
35-64 47 .1 24 .1 31.5
(24) (13) (17)
65 + 21. 6 46.3 9.3
(11) (25) (5)
UNK - 5.6
(3)
C. Ethnic/Race
Black 100 94 . 4 100
(51) (51) (54)
American Indian - 1.9
(1)
-
UNK 3.7
(2)
D. Gender
Male 43.1 38. 9 31. 5
(22) (21) (17)
Female 56.9 61.1 68 . 5
(29) (33) (37)
NOTE:: Figures in parentheses are numbers of responses.
selected only those individuals in the same census tracts used in the previous surveys. 
Another problem encountered was that the 1993 survey did not ask for zip codes, so I 
could not select cases in the same zip codes as the O.H.A. developments. To see if this 
was going to be a problem, I looked at the prior surveys to determine what percent of my 
cases had incomes under $10,000 and lived in the O.H.A. zip code areas. In 1990, fifty- 
two respondents had incomes under $10,000 and fifty-one lived inside the O.H.A. zip 
code areas (98 percent). In 1991, fifty-four of the fifty-five cases (98 percent) with 
incomes under $10,000 lived within the O.H.A. zip codes. It appears from this 
information that income drives where the people live. So for 1993,1 assumed that the 
probability was high that my sample of fifty-four (with incomes under $10,000 who lived
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in the same census tracts as the two previous surveys) lived in or around the O.H.A. 
housing developments.
Outcome Measures
Crime
To test the hypothesis that crime will decrease over time in Omaha as COP is 
implemented, I will evaluate yearly changes in the number of crimes for both the Metro­
politan and North Omaha samples. Two methods are used in the United States to 
measure crime. The first method is the FBI's Uniform Crime Report (UCR). The UCR 
contains data on crimes reported to law enforcement agencies. I will evaluate the UCR 
data from 1987 to 1994 for the entire city of Omaha. To evaluate what effect the S.P.U. 
had on crime, the Omaha Police Department also provided me with crime data for the 
O.H.A. low-income housing areas from 1989 to 1991. Each crime (except arson) will be 
evaluated individually, then grouped by crimes against persons and crimes against 
property for the city of Omaha and the low-income housing areas.
The second method used to measure crime is the Bureau of Justice Statistics' 
National Crime Survey (NCS). The NCS data comes from household surveys that asks 
individuals if they were victims of crime. Because many crimes are not reported, 
victimization surveys are frequently used to measure the crime rate. Both the 
Metropolitan and North Omaha surveys contained three questions that are part of the 
NCS and should be a good indicator of changes in crime:
(1) Did anyone break into your (apartment/home), garage, or another building on your 
property?
(2) (Other than the incident(s) just mentioned) Did you find a door jimmied, a lock 
forced, or any other signs of an ATTEMPTED break-in?
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(3) Was anything at all stolen that is kept outside your home, or happened to be left out, 
such as a bicycle, a garden hose, or lawn furniture? (other than any incidents already 
mentioned).
Both of the 1990 Metropolitan and North Omaha surveys ask if the individual was 
victimized between July 1 and December 31, 1989. Additionally, both of the 1991 
surveys ask if they were victimized between July 1 and December 31,1990. The 1994 
Metropolitan survey asked about the time period from April 1 to September 31, 1994.
The telescoping problem that is controlled for in the NCS can't be controlled in this 
evaluation. Table III shows which years the crime data will be evaluated.
TABLE III.— CRIME DATA
Metro 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Crime Data X X X X X X X X
Break-In (BI) X X X
Attempted BI X X X
Stolen Outside X X X
O.H.A.
Crime Data X X X X
BI X X
Attempted BI X X
Stolen Outside X X
Citizens' Perception Of Crime
Two areas were evaluated to determine any changes in citizens' perceptions of 
crime, gangs, and drugs. The first areas was their perception of changes in the crime 
situation. They asked if the crime situation in the Omaha area changed in the past few 
years for the better, has it remained about the same, or has it changed for the worse? The 
second area evaluated changes with how citizens prioritized crime problems. The
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following questions were asked:
(1) What are the three best things about the Omaha area?
(2) What are the three worst things about the Omaha area?
(3) What are the three most important problems that the Omaha area should be trying to 
address?
(4) What is the one best thing about your neighborhood?
(5) What is the one worst thing about your neighborhood?
(6) What is the one most important problem that your neighborhood should be trying to 
address?
Table IV shows these questions and the years they were asked.
TABLE IV.— CITIZENS' PERCEPTION OF CRIME
Metro 1990 
Crime Situation Changed X
1991
X
1993 1994
X
3 Best Things X X X X
3 Worst Things X X X X
3 Important Problems X X X X
1 Best Neighborhood X X X
1 Worst Neighborhood X X X
1 Imp. Neigh. Problem X X X
O.H.A.
Crime Situation Changed X X N/A
3 Best Things X X N/A
3 Worst Things X X N/A
3 Important Problems X X N/A
1 Best Neighborhood X X N/A
1 Worst Neighborhood X X N/A
1 Imp. Neigh. Problem X X N/A
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Citizens' Fear of Crime
The surveys asked if the respondents were very worried, a little worried, or not at 
all worried about crime. This question was asked on the 1990, 1991, and 1994 
Metropolitan surveys; and on the 1990 and 1991 North Omaha surveys. This question 
will test the hypothesis that fear of crime will decrease with the implementation of COP.
Citizens' Quality of Interaction With OPD Officers
I will use a variety of questions from the four Metropolitan surveys to test if 
citizens' attitudes, perceptions, and satisfaction with the Omaha Police Department will 
improve over time as COP is being implemented. Table V shows which years these 
questions were asked.
TABLE V.— CITIZENS' ATTITUDES & PERCEPTIONS OF THE OPD
Metro Only 1990 1991 1993 1994
Sat W/ Police Protection X X
Sat W/ Police Response X X
Called OPD Was Officer Courteous X X
Called OPD Was Officer Helpful X X
Called OPD Was Officer Professional X X
Stopped By OPD Was Off. Courteous X X
Stopped By OPD Was Off. Professional X X
Officer Demeanor X X
Officer Characteristics X X
The following questions measure citizens' satisfaction with the Omaha Police 
Department:
(1) How satisfied are you with police protection at the present time?
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(2) When you called the Omaha Police Department in the past two years, how satisfied 
were you with how quickly the police responded to your call?
There are two sets of questions that focus on residents' experiences with the
police. The first set was asked to individuals who had called the Omaha Police
Department in the past two years:
(1) Was the officer courteous?
(2) Was the officer helpful?
(3) Was the officer professional?
The second set of questions were asked to individuals who had been stopped (at any time) 
by an Omaha Police Department officer:
(1) Was the officer courteous?
(2) Was the officer professional?
Another set of questions asked individuals about their general views of the OPD 
officers. These questions dealt with officer demeanor and officer characteristics. The 
questions on officer demeanor follow:
(1) OPD officers are usually courteous.
(2) OPD officers are respectful toward people like me.
(3) OPD officers use more force than they need to in carrying out their duties.
(4) Most police officers are usually rude.
(5) Police officers show concern when you ask them questions.
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The questions on officer characteristics were:
(1) OPD officers are physically fit.
(2) OPD officers are prejudiced against minority persons.
(3) OPD officers are not able to answer citizens' questions correctly.
(4) OPD officers respond quickly to calls for service.
Additionally, some of the respondents answered “law enforcement” to the 
questions in Table IV. Any changes over time in how law enforcement is perceived will 
also be a good indication of how citizens feel about the OPD.
Analysis Procedures 
A two-part time-series analysis will be used in this study to see if the implemen­
tation of COP in Omaha supports my four hypotheses. The first part of the analysis will 
look at the entire city of Omaha. This design is possible because the first survey in 1990 
occurred before COP was implemented in the entire city of Omaha. The other surveys 
will reflect data as COP is being introduced in Omaha. The second part o f the analysis 
will focus on the O.H.A. housing areas where the Selective Patrol Unit was operating.
The first North Omaha survey that occurred in 1990 will be the baseline as there was no 
real community policing effort in the O.H.A. housing areas. The latter evaluations will 
reflect data that coincides with the implementation of the Selective Patrol Unit. Table VI 
shows what activities were going on in Omaha when each survey was conducted. All of 
the survey questions will be analyzed using the "Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences" program.
In a normal time-series design, three measurements are usually made before and 
after the introduction of the independent variable. Because my data is from 1990 to 1994,
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TABLE VI.— COMMUNITY POLICING ACTIVITIES
1990 Metropolitan Survey (January 11-29, 1990)
1. COP was not yet implemented city-wide.
1990 North Omaha Survey (January 30 - February 5, 1990)
1. Fifteen officers working in the O.H.A. housing developments, 
but there was no direction or focus.
1991 Metropolitan Survey (February 20 - March 9, 1991)
1. Jefferson Square foot patrol created in July 1990 to address 
homeless in the Jefferson Square Business District.
1991 North Omaha Survey (March 14-19, 1991)
1. SPU started in July 1990; 8 months old.
2. August 1990, SPU involved in AUGUSTFEST.
3. October 1990, Halloween "Officer Friendly."
4. Preparation for the March 26-27, 1991 "Overnighter."
5. Information Exchange cards were being used more.
6. Traffic problems were addressed in the Hilltop and Spencer 
Homes in late 1990.
1993 Metropolitan Survey (June 24 - July 19, 1993)
1. Bicycle patrol expanded to other parts of the city.
2. Problem-oriented policing training provided in November 1992.
3. April 1993, started training on community policing.
4. Weeds and Seeds program expanded.
1993 North Omaha Survey (August 12-24, 1993)
1. Bike patrol started in April 1992; held some bike rodeos.
2. Ban and Bar letters started in July 1991.
3. New equipment purchased by the PHDEP Grant was being used.
4. More "Overnighters" occurred.
5. Traffic Checkpoints started in October 1991.
1994 Metropolitan Survey (October 10 - November 11, 1994)
1. City-wide implementation of community policing started in 
December 1993.
2. Strategic Planning to implement community policing.
3. Public meetings held to discuss community policing.
4. A lot of publicity over the implementation plans for community 
policing.
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this was not possible. The internal validity of this method is sometimes questioned 
because extraneous variables can cause the noted change. Some of these changes can be 
caused by history or maturation.
Two other problems with the North Omaha sample need to be addressed. First, 
some of the questions were asked in 1990 and repeated in 1991. Since the S.P.U. started 
in July 1990, a time period of eight months may be too short to reflect changes in the 
1991 survey. The other problem is that some of the questions were asked in 1991, after 
the S.P.U. was started, and repeated in 1993. Because a pretest measure was not 
conducted, it is impossible to determine if the first measurement is an improvement or 
decline over the period before the S.P.U. started. The only conclusion that can be drawn 
is that after the S.P.U. started, attitudes changed in a certain direction.
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION IN OMAHA
In this last section I will show the results of the crime data and the 1990 to 1994 
Omaha Conditions Surveys. The Metropolitan surveys will be used to depict data for the 
entire city of Omaha. The North Omaha surveys will be used for the O.H.A. housing 
areas. I will also discuss the findings of my analysis and draw some conclusions on the 
effectiveness of community oriented policing in Omaha.
Crime
The first hypothesis is that crime will decrease over time in Omaha as COP is 
implemented. The UCR crime data and victimization surveys will be evaluated to 
determine if a decrease has occurred.
The 1987 to 1994 UCR Part I Index crimes (except arson) for the entire city of 
Omaha along with the 1989 to 1991 data for the O.H.A. housing developments are shown 
in Tables VII through IX. This information was received from the Omaha Police 
Department. The percentage of change between the two years is in parentheses.
The first column in Table VII is the total number of Index crimes against persons 
for the city of Omaha and the O.H.A. area. In Omaha, crimes against persons increased 
54.9 percent from 1987 to 1994. In the O.H.A. area from 1989 to 1991 crime increased 
1.5 percent, while in Omaha it increased 17.9 percent during this three-year period.
Table VIII is a breakdown of the crimes against persons. For the city of Omaha, 
each of these crimes increased. From 1989 to 1991 there were some differences between 
Omaha and the O.H.A. area. Murder stayed the same in the O.H.A.
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TABLE VII.— UCR TOTAL INDEX CRIMES
Crimes Against 
Persons
Crimes Against 
Property
Total
Omaha O.H.A. Omaha O.H.A. Omaha O.H.A.
1987 2537 21847 2.4384
( + 9 %) ( - 3 %) (-2%;
1988 2774 21170 23944
( - 1 %) ( - 3 %) ( - 3 %)
1989 2750 194 20594 320 23344 514
( + 1 4 %) ( - 9 %) ( - 3 3 %) ( + 1 %) ( - 2 4 %)
1990 3140 111 20534 214 23674 391
( + 3 %) ( + 1 1 %) ( + 1 %) ( + 6 %) ( + 1 %) ( + 8 %)
1991 3242 197 20762 226 24004 423
( + 8 %) ( + 5 %) ( + 6 %)
1992 3517 21830 25347
( + 1 1 %) ( - 1 %) ( + 1 %)
1993 3899 21626 25525
( + 1 %) ( + 9 %) ( + 8 %)
1994 3930 23611 27541
TABLE VIII.--UCR CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
Murder Rape Robbery Assault
Omaha OHA Omaha OHA Omaha OHA Omaha OHA
1987 29 189 570 1749
1988
( - 3 %)
28
( + 1 4 %)
216
( + 2 5 %)
710
( + 4 %)
1820
1989
( - 1 8 %)
23 3
( - 1 3 %)
188 4
( - 1 0 %)
638 34
( + 4 %)
1901 153
1990
( - 4 8 %)
12
(-67%;
1
( + 1 5 %)
217
( + 1 7 5 %)
11
(-5%;
604
( - 2 1 %)
27
( + 2 1 %)
2307
( - 1 0 %)
138
1991
(+192%;
35
( +2 0 0 %)
3
( - 5 %)
207
( - 1 8 %)
9
( + 5 %)
634
( - 4 0 %)
16
( + 3 %)
2366
(+22%;
169
1992
(-29%;
25
( + 3 %)
213
( + 7%)
678
( + 1 0 %)
2601
1993
( + 2 8 %)
32
(-2 %;
209
( + 1 1 %)
752
(+12%;
2906
1994
( + 3 %)
33
( + 4 %)
217
(+22%;
918
( - 5 %)
2762
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area and went up in Omaha. Rape more than doubled in the O.H.A. area and went up 
15.4 percent in Omaha. Robbery was the only crime that was less in 1991 than in 1989 in 
both Omaha and the O.H.A. area. In the O.H.A. area robbery was cut in half. For assault 
both areas had an increase, however it was larger in Omaha (24.5 percent) than in the 
O.H.A. area (10.5 percent).
The total number of Index crimes against property for Omaha and the O.H.A. area 
are in the middle column of Table VII. Omaha had an increase over the years. From 
1989 to 1991 there was a .8 percent increase in the city of Omaha and a decrease of 29 
percent in the O.H.A. area.
Table IX is a breakdown of the crimes against property. In the city of Omaha 
burglary was the only crime that decreased and larceny decreased from the 1987 numbers 
but increased after COP started in 1989. The crime that increased the most was motor 
vehicle theft. There were some differences between Omaha and the O.H.A. area from 
1989 to 1991. In the O.H.A. area all of the property crimes decreased even though they 
fluctuated each year. During this same time period all of the crimes increased in Omaha 
except burglary, which decreased 16 percent. This decrease in burglary was greater than 
the 11 percent decrease in the O.H.A. area.
The total number of UCR Index crimes for Omaha and the O.H.A. area are in the 
last column of Table VII. The number of crimes in Omaha increased over the years. In 
the O.H.A. area the total UCR Index crimes went down 21.5 percent. Comparing Omaha 
to the O.H.A. area from 1989 to 1991, Omaha increased and the O.H.A. area decreased.
The second part of the analysis will look at the victimization data to see if it 
decreased over time as COP was being implemented. The results from the victimization 
questions asked on both the Metropolitan and North Omaha surveys are in Table X. The 
sample column contains the percentage and number of respondents (in parentheses) who
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TABLE IX.— UCR CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
Burglary Larceny Motor Vehicle Theft
Omaha OHA Omaha OHA Omaha OHA
1987 5338 15292 1217
( - 1 4 %) ( - 1 %) ( + 1 5 %)
1988 4580 15185 1405
( + 4 %) ( - 3 %) ( + 4 %)
1989 4760 70 14368 188 1466 62
( - 1 2 %) ( + 9 %) ( + 4 %) ( - 4 4 %) ( - 8 %) ( - 4 8 %)
1990 4190 76 14997 106 1347 32
( - 5 %) ( - 1 8 %) ( + . 3 %) ( + 1 7 %) ( +2 9 %) ( + 2 5 %)
1991 3986 62 15040 124 1736 40
( - 3 %) ( - 2 %) ( + 8 7 %)
1992 3880 14703 3247
( + 0 %) ( - 5 %) (+1 7%)
1993 3879 13958 3789
( + 1 3 %) ( + 6 %) ( + 1 5 %)
1994 4398 14843 4370
were victimized by a break-in, attempted break-in, or a theft of anything from outside 
their homes within six months of the survey. The demographic characteristics show the 
percentage and number of respondents in those categories that were victimized by the 
particular crime.
To properly evaluate this data, the dates of the surveys and the period they cover 
should be restated. Both of the 1990 surveys asked people if the crimes occurred be­
tween July 1, 1989 and December 31, 1989. Both of the 1991 surveys asked respondents 
about the time period of July 1, 1990 to December 31, 1990. The 1994 Metropolitan 
survey covers April 1, 1994 to September 31, 1994. The data from the victimization 
surveys in Table X shows that each of the three incidents decreased from the 1990 to 
1991 surveys and went back up in the 1994 survey for Omaha. I used a program called 
“Biostatistics” to see if the changes from year to year were statistically significant. The 
results are contained in Table XXIV. The numbers shown in this table are the levels of
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significance. In Omaha, the decreases from 1990 to 1991 were statistically significant for 
break-ins (p=.006), attempted break-ins (p=.008), and if anything was stolen from outside 
the person’s house (p=.014). From 1991 to 1994 the increase was only significant for 
attempted break-ins and if anything was stolen from outside. Overall from 1990 to 1994, 
break-ins and attempted break-ins decreased. However, they were not statistically 
significant as depicted in Table XXIV. One possible cause for the increase in 
victimization from 1991 to 1994 could be the fact that in 1994 different months were 
used. These months included spring and summer, which historically have more crime 
than the winter months because the weather is nicer.
Comparing the victimization data in Table X with the UCR property crimes of 
burglary and larceny in Table IX produces the same trends. Table IX shows that burglary 
decreased in Omaha from 1989 to 1994 and Table X also has a decrease for break-ins and 
attempted break-ins from the 1990 (July 1-December 31, 1989 time frame) to 1994 
surveys. For larceny Table IX shows an increase from 1989 to 1994. An increase is also 
shown in Table X from the 1990 to 1994 surveys under the “Stolen Outside” category.
In the O.H.A. area each of the three incidents also decreased in 1991, although 
Table XXIV does not show a statistically significant difference. Because there are only 
two years of data in the O.H.A. area more is needed for a better conclusion of COP’s 
effectiveness. As COP expanded in Omaha under the Weed and Seed program it was 
used in the Benson public housing areas and the north Omaha Fairfax neighborhoods. As 
these areas are predominantly minority and low-income, the race and income categories 
o f the Omaha sample are a good place to look for changes over time. There were some 
notable differences. First, non-whites reported a large decrease in the number of break- 
ins and attempted break-ins each year. This did not occur for whites, as they reported
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more attempted break-ins in 1994 than in 1990 and a small drop in the number of break- 
ins. In the "Stolen Outside" category whites were higher in 1994 than they were in 1990 
and nonwhites were lower. Second, if the person earned less than $25,000 they reported 
fewer break-ins each successive year. All of the income categories except the $25-49,000 
and “Don’t Know” had le33 attempted break-ins in 1994 than there were in 1990. When 
asked if anything was stolen from outside their homes, the income categories with 
increases from 1990 to 1994 were the $0-9,999 and $50,000 plus categories.
There are mixed results for community oriented policing’s effectiveness on crime 
and victimization in Omaha. With increases in the UCR Index crimes, I must conclude 
that the implementation of COP in the city of Omaha did not reduce the crime rate. The 
only support for my hypothesis that crime and victimization rates would decrease over 
time in Omaha as COP was implemented can be found in the burglary data. Burglary 
was the only UCR Index crime that decreased. Break-ins and attempted break-ins 
decreased from 1990 to 1994 in the victimization surveys; but because these changes 
were not statistically significant I can not say they support my hypothesis.
However, some of the data from the O.H.A. area does support my hypothesis. 
First, the total UCR Index crimes were lower in 1991. Second, the UCR Index crimes 
against property were also lower. The 29 percent decrease in property crime in the 
O.H.A. area occurred while there was an increase in Omaha. Additionally, all of the 
property crimes listed in Table IX were lower in the O.H.A. area. Third, even though 
crimes against persons went up, there was less of an increase in the O.H.A. area than in 
Omaha. When each of the crimes in Table VIII is examined individually, the O.H.A. area 
had better results than Omaha on each one except rape. Finally, in the victimization 
surveys there were decreased in all three of the categories from 1990 to 1991. However, 
Table XXIV shows these changes from 1990 to 1991 as not being statistically significant.
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More data from additional years is needed to determine if this improvement will last. In 
Omaha all of the categories also decreased in 1991 and then went up in 1994. This same 
trend may occur in the O.H.A, area.
There are demographic differences in the Omaha portion of Table X that also 
supports the effectiveness of COP on crime. There was a large decrease in break-ins and 
attempted break-ins each year for nonwhites. In the “Stolen Outside” category there was 
an increase for the whites and a decrease in the nonwhites from 1990 to 1994. Turning to
the income categories, the results were mixed.
Citizens' Perception of Crime 
The second hypothesis says that as COP is implemented citizens will perceive 
crime as less of a problem. Citizens’ perceptions of the crime situation and the priority of
crime problems will be evaluated for changes over time.
Table XI contains the results from both the Metropolitan and North Omaha 
surveys for the question: “Has the crime situation in the Omaha area changed in the past 
few years for the better, has it remained about the same, or has it changed for the worse?” 
In the metropolitan surveys, no response or “don’t know” was received by 11 people (2.5 
percent) in 1990, 19 people (4.7 percent) in 1991, and by 12 people (2.4 percent) in 1994. 
For the O.H.A. area there was one “don’t know” reply in 1991 comprising 1.9 percent of 
the sample. Because less than five percent of the sample either had no response or 
answered “don’t know,” I excluded these responses from the table. That is why the 
sample column of the table doesn’t add up to 100 percent. Additionally, these responses 
were not used in the chi-square calculations to determine significant differences between 
the groups. The demographic characteristics were also calculated without these 
responses.
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The Omaha sample shows a small increases in the percentage of people who felt 
the crime situation got better from 1990 (3.2 percent) to 1991 (4.7 percent). In 1994 this 
figure dropped to 2.8 percent, which was even lower than the 1990 level. Table XXIY 
shows that none of these changes were statistically significant. The increase in the 
number of people who felt the crime situation was worse in 1994 than in 1990 was 
statistically significant. This number went up from 75.1 percent in 1990 to 83.8 percent 
in 1994. This negative trend does not support the hypothesis.
The percentage of residents in the O.H.A. area who felt the crime situation was 
better more than doubled from 1990 (9.8 percent) to 1991 (20.4 percent). However, 
Table XXIV does not show this as a statistically significant difference. Those who felt 
the crime situation was worse did drop significantly (p-.003) from 82.4 percent in 1990 
to 53.7 percent in 1991. Although these changes from 1990 to 1991 were similar to 
Omaha, the percentages were much larger in the O.H.A. area. This data seems to support 
the hypothesis that as COP is implemented in the O.H.A. area citizens’ perceptions of the 
crime problem will decrease.
Going back to the Omaha data, there are a couple of other differences between the 
white and nonwhite categories that need to be pointed out. The percentage of whites that 
felt the crime situation was better decreased from 3.1 percent to 2.6 percent in 1994. For 
the nonwhites the opposite occurred, as there was a small percentage increase. For those 
who said the crime situation was worse there was almost a ten percent increase in whites 
from 1990 (76.3 percent) to 1994 (86.2 percent). In the nonwhite category there was a 
much smaller three percent increase from 1990 to 1994. No statistically significant 
differences were found between the two race categories. From this data I can conclude 
that white citizens’ perceptions of crime do not support the hypothesis. Although the
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results from the nonwhites are more positive than the whites, I can not say with 
confidence that there is support for the hypothesis.
In the income category of the Omaha area, the survey respondents who earned 
under $25,000 felt the crime situation was better in 1994 than in 1990. As the income 
increased so did the percentage of respondents who felt the crime situation was worse in
1994. In fact the $0-9,999 income category had a five percent decrease from 1990 (80 
percent) to 1994 (75 percent) in the respondents who said the crime situation was worse. 
All of the other categories increased except those who did not report their income. These 
differences seem to support the hypothesis for the low-income respondents.
The second part of this hypothesis looked at how citizens prioritize crime. Open- 
ended questions were asked in both surveys to solicit responses about the three best 
things, three worst things, and three most important problems in the Omaha area. Open- 
ended questions were also asked about the one best thing, one worst thing, and most 
important problem in the respondents' neighborhoods. Tables XII through XIV show the 
results from these questions. The number of responses were calculated by counting the 
number of times a particular item was mentioned as being one of the three best, worst, or 
most important problem. This number is in the parentheses of the table. The percentage 
was figured by dividing this total by the number of respondents who answered the 
question. For example; in the 1990 Metropolitan survey "low crime rate" was mentioned 
11 times as the "best thing about Omaha," 9 times as the second best, and 8 times as the 
third best for a total of 28. A total of 404 respondents answered the question for a 6.9 
percent rate (28/404 = 6.9%).
In Table XII, the percentage of respondents who said one of the best things about 
the city of Omaha and their neighborhoods were the low crime rates increased over the
106
years. This was true for Omaha and the O.H.A. areas. Additionally, the O.H.A. area had 
a greater percentage increase than Omaha in these numbers.
TABLE XII.— THREE BEST THINGS ABOUT OMAHA AREA AND ONE BEST THINGS ABOUT
YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD
1990
%(N)
1991 
% (N)
1993 
% (N)
1994 
% (N)
A. 3 Best-Omaha
Low Crime Rate 6.9(28) 6.9(26) 15.5(71) 15.9(75)
Law Enforcement 3.0(12) 1.6(6) 3.3(15) —
B. 3 Best-O.H.A. Area
Low Crime Rate 2.8(1) 9.6(5) . . _ _
Law Enforcement 2.8(1) 9.6(5) — —
C. 1 Best-Omaha Neighborhood
Low Crime Rate 5.8(22) 9.2 (43) 11.7 (55)
Law Enforcement -- .8(3) .6(3) —
D. 1 Best-O.H . A . Neighborhood
Low Crime Rate 2.1(1) 8.2(4) __
Less Gang Activity 2.0(1)
There are opposite findings for crime in Table XIII than in the previous table for 
Omaha. The percentage of people who said crime was one of the worst things in Omaha 
increased dramatically from 1990 to 1994. When asked about the worst things in their 
neighborhoods, crime also increased with each year in Omaha. The findings for gangs 
and drugs were mixed. There was a reduction over the years in the number of respon­
dents who said gangs and drugs were one of the worst things about Omaha. But when 
asked about the worst thing in their neighborhoods, more Omaha residents mentioned 
gangs and drugs in 1994 than in 1991.
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TABLE XIII.— THREE WORST THINGS ABOUT OMAHA AREA AND ONE WORST THINGS
ABOUT YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD
1990 
% (N)
1991 
% (N)
1993 
% (N)
1994 
% (N)
A. 3 Worst-Omaha
Crime 19.1(77) 12.9(48) 30.2(139) 61.7(291)
Gangs 28.5(115) 15.5 (58) 13.0(60) 8.9(42)
Drugs 31.0(125) 10.7(40) .9(4) 1.3(6)
Law Enforcement 6.2(25) 5.6(21) 6.3 (29) - -
Crimes/Gangs/Drugs — 10.5(39) 10.8(50) 8.5 (40)
B.
Combinations 
3 Worst-O. H. A.
Crime 26.5(13) 18.4(9)
Gangs 38.8(19) 28.6(14) — —
Drugs 38.8(19) 6.1(3) — --
Law Enforcement 14.3(7) 20.4(10) — - -
Crimes/Gangs/Drugs — 12.2(6) — —
C.
Combinations 
1 Worst-Omaha Neighborhood
Crime 7.7(19) 12.9(44) 19.7(68)
Gangs — 2.0(5) 2.9(10) 3.8(13)
Drugs -- .8(2) • 6(2) .9(3)
Law Enforcement -- 2.0(5) 1.2(4) --
D. 1 Worst-O.H.A. Neighborhood
Crime 15.8(6) 12.8(6) __
Gangs — 10.5(4) 12.8(6) —
Drugs -- 5.3(2) 4.3(2) --
Law Enforcement 2.6(1) 4.3(2)
Turning to the O.H.A. area, the percentage of survey respondents who said crime 
was one of the worst things in Omaha decreased. This decrease from 1990 to 1991 was 
greater in the O.H.A. area than in Omaha during this time period. There was also a 
decrease in the number of respondents who mentioned gangs and drugs as one of the 
worst things about Omaha. In the O.H.A. area, the number of respondents who said 
crime and drugs were the worst things about their neighborhoods decreased from 1991 to 
1993. This decrease in crime corresponds to an increase in the Omaha area
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neighborhoods. One negative trend with the O.H.A. data was the increase in people who 
mentioned gangs as one of the worse things in their neighborhood.
Table XIV contains the results of the most important problems in Omaha and in 
the respondents' neighborhood. Citizens in Omaha view crime as an increasing problem 
for the city, while in the O.H.A. area fewer respondents considered it an important 
problem for Omaha. Because there is only two years of data in the O.H.A. area, I can’t 
conclude that this downward trend will continue in subsequent years. It may increase in 
subsequent years and mimic the Omaha data.
TABLE XIV.— THREE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS IN OMAHA AND MOST IMPORTANT
PROBLEM IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD
1990 
% (N)
1991 
% (N)
1993 
% (N)
1994
(N)
A. 3 Important Problem Omaha
Crime 19.0(80) 11.9(46) 29.3(139) 65.8(316)
Gangs 39.6(167) 16.1(62) 17.9(85) 9.0(43)
Drugs 50.7 (214) 15.1 (58) 1.9(9) 1.0(5)
Law Enforcement 2.8(12) 4.4(17) 5.3(25)
Crimes/Gangs/Drugs — 19.0(73) 14.5(69) 12.7(6:)
Combinations
B. 3 Important Problem O.. H . A.
Crime 21.3(10) 12.5(6) — —
Gangs 38.3(18) 14.6 (7) — —
Drugs 48.9(23) 14.6(7) — —
Law Enforcement 14.9(7) 10.4(5) — —
Crimes/Gangs/Drugs — 14.6(7) — —
Combinations
C. 1 Important Problem--Omaha Neighborhood
Crime — 14.8(32) 23.9(84) 44.1 (157)
Gangs — 1.9(4) 4.0(14) 5.1(18)
Drugs — 3.7 (8) 3.1(11) 2.0(7)
Law Enforcement — 2.3(5) 1.1(4) —
Crimes/Gangs/Drugs — — 1.0(3) .3(1)
Combinations
D. 1 Important Problem--O.H .A . Neighborhood
Crime — 13.2(5) 8.0(4) —
Gangs — 10.5 (4) 24.0(12) —
Drugs — 10.5 (4) 20.0(10) —
Crimes/Gangs/Drugs — 2.6(1) — —
Combinations
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One difference between Omaha and the O.H.A. area was the perception of crime 
in the neighborhoods. In Omaha, it was perceived as more of a problem throughout the 
years, but in the O.H.A. area less people felt it was an important neighborhood problem.
There are a couple of general conclusions that can be made from all of this data. 
First, the findings in Omaha do not support my hypothesis that as COP is implemented, 
citizens’ perceptions of crime problems will decrease. There was a statistically 
significant increase in the number of Omaha respondents who felt the crime situation was 
worse in 1994 than in 1990. Additionally, even though more people said one of the best 
things about Omaha was the low crime rate, there was a much larger increase in those 
who felt crime was one of the worst things in Omaha. This same large increase was 
noted when crime was mentioned as an important problem in Omaha. These same find­
ings also occurred in Omaha when they focused on their neighborhoods.
In the O.H.A. area there appears to be some support for my hypothesis. There 
was a statistically significant decrease in the number of people who said the crime 
situation was worse, and this decrease was greater than in Omaha. The trend for crime 
also went in the direction it should to support my hypothesis in all three of the tables that 
contained the data for the best, worst, and most important problems. Less people 
identified gangs as the worse thing about Omaha and as a problem, but more people 
identified it as a neighborhood concern. Because of this trend, I have to conclude that 
community oriented policing had no effect on citizens’ perceptions of gangs. The mixed 
results for drugs also lead me to conclude that COP did not effect it.
Citizens' Fear of Crime 
The third hypothesis is that a decline in the fear of crime will occur as COP is 
implemented. Both the Metropolitan and North Omaha surveys asked citizens: “Are you
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very worried, a little worried, or not at all worried about crime?” The results are in Table 
XV. In the Omaha area, no response or “don’t know” was received by two people (.4 
percent) in 1990, three people (.7 percent) in 1991, and by one person (.2 percent) in 
1994. For the O.H.A. area there was one “don’t know” reply in 1991 comprising 1.9 
percent of the sample. Because less than five percent of the sample either had no 
response or answered “don’t know,” I excluded these responses from the table. That is 
why the sample column of the table doesn’t add up to 100 percent. Additionally, these 
responses were not used in the chi-square calculations to determine significant differences 
between the demographic categories. The demographic characteristics were also 
calculated without these responses.
In Omaha there was an increase in the percentage of respondents who were very 
worried about crime from 1990 to 1994. Additionally, fewer people were a little worried 
or not worried about crime in 1994 than they were in 1990. In Table XXIV there were no 
statistically significant differences from 1990 to 1994. These results do not support the 
hypothesis.
A comparison of the race and income categories found in Table XV for Omaha 
shows two interesting findings. The first finding was that whites became more worried 
about crime and nonwhites became less worried about crime. For very worried the 
percentage of whites increased by 8.4 percent and it decreased by 14.9 percent for non­
whites from 1990 to 1994. The percentage of whites also dropped in the not worried 
category by 4 percent and increased for the nonwhites by 4.9 percent. Statistically 
significant differences occurred between the two race categories in 1990 and 1991.
Under income, the only category that had a decrease in the percentage of respondents 
who were very worried about crime from 1990 to 1994 was the $0-9,999 category. There 
were three categories ($0-9,999, 50,000+, and “Don’t Know Income”) that had an
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increase in the percentage of respondents not worried about crime from 1990 to 1994. 
Finally, of all the known income categories the $0-9,999 category went from the lowest 
percentage of respondents saying they were not worried about crime in 1990 to the 
highest percentage in 1994. There were statistically significant differences between the 
income categories in 1991 and 1994. This data appears to suppurl a reduction in the fear 
of crime in the nonwhite and low-income populations of Omaha.
Comparing changes from 1990 to 1991 between the O.H.A. and Omaha samples 
also support the position that community policing is having some positive changes on the 
nonwhite and low-income groups. There was a 16.6 percent drop in the Omaha sample 
who were very worried about crime and a much larger 26.2 percent drop in the O.H.A. 
sample. Table XXIV indicates that this drop from 1990 to 1991 in the O.H.A. area was 
statistically significant. This data supports my hypothesis in the O.H.A. area.
Quality of Interaction 
The final hypothesis said that citizens’ quality of interaction with the OPD 
officers would improve as COP is implemented. This would be measured by their 
attitudes, perceptions, and satisfaction with the Omaha Police Department. Since there is 
so much data to analyze, Table XXIII at the end of this section will show where the 
hypothesis was supported.
The first set of data on law enforcement comes from the open-ended questions on 
the best and worst things in Omaha, the best and worst things in individuals’ 
neighborhoods, and the most important problems found in Tables XII through XIV. In 
Table XII, there were three times as many respondents in the O.H.A. area from 1990 to 
1991 who said law enforce-ment was one of the best things about Omaha. In Omaha it 
decreased from 1990 to 1991 and then returned to the same level in 1993 that it was in
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1990. In Table XIII, the number of people who identified law enforcement as one of the 
worst things in Omaha increased in 1991 for the O.H.A. area and remained fairly constant 
for all of Omaha. When asked about the worst thing in their neighborhoods, there was an 
improved attitude toward law enforcement in Omaha and there was a negative attitude in 
the O.H.A. area as more people identified law enforcement as the worst thing. In Table 
XIV, law enforcement was considered less of an important problem for Omaha by 
respondents in the O.H.A. area than in the city of Omaha. These mixed results make it 
impossible to draw any solid conclusions about how respondents felt about law 
enforcement.
The rest of the questions in this section were only asked on the Metropolitan 
surveys. In the demographic characteristics I will be able to discuss differences between 
the race and income categories and show any changes over time. Table XXIII will show 
these changes that support my hypothesis for nonwhites and those in the $0-9,999 income 
category.
Table XVI contains the data to the question “how satisfied are you with police 
protection?” The top portion of the table breaks down each year by the degree of 
satisfaction. The second half o f this table combines both the satisfied categories and 
shows the results along with the demographics of the sample. The column on the right 
side of the table labeled “Change Over Years” contains the statistical difference for the 
reply from one year to the other and is also included through Table XXII.
The top portion of Table XVI shows that no response or “don’t know” was 
received by six people (1.4 percent) in 1990 and three people (.6 percent) in 1993.
Because less than five percent of the sample either had no response or answered “don’t 
know,” I excluded these responses when calculating the chi-squares for the demographic 
characteristics. If any of the respondents didn’t know or didn’t report which demographic
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category they fell in and it was below five percent, I also deleted those responses and 
performed the chi-squares without them.
Although there was a statistically significant decline in the percentage of 
respondents “very satisfied” with police protection, there was a significant increase in 
those “somewhat satisfied.” The bottom part of this table sho ws that these two categories 
combined produced very little change in satisfaction with police protection from 1990 to 
1993.
TABLE XVI.— OMAHA AREA RESPONSE TO SATISFACTION WITH POLICE PROTECTION
1990
*6
(N = 433) 
(N)
1993
Q.*o
(N = 489) 
(N)
Change 
Over Years
Very Satisfied 43.0 (186) 34 . 6 (169) p = . O i l
Somewhat Satisfied 40.4 (175) 49.3 (241) p = . 0 0 8
Somewhat Dissatisfied 10.2 (44) 11.2 (55) p=.702
Very Dissatisfied 5.1 (22) 4 . 3 (21) p=.67 6
No Response/Don't Know 1.4 (6) . 6 (3) p=.369
OMAHA AREA DEMOGRAPHICS FOR VERY AND SOMEWHAT SATISFIED
Sample 83.4 (361) 83.8 (410) p=.941
Age
18-34 ***76.4 (120) *83.7 (164)
35-64 87.4 (160) 80. 9 (165)
65 + 93. 0 (80) 94 . 0 (78)
Race
White ***88 . 7 (322) ***86.2 (375)
Nonwhite 60. 3 (38) 67. 3 (33)
Income
$0-9,999 77 . 3 (34) 90.0 (36)
$10-24,999 82.2 (120) 84 . 5 (87)
$25-49,999 86.4 (133) 83. 1 (167)
$50,000+ 88 . 9 (32) 86.3 (88)
Unknown 93.8 (30) 80.0 (32)
Gender
Male 82 .3 (153) 86.0 (202)
Female 86.3 (208) 82. 9 (208)
* p < .05 between the categories in that survey year
** p < .01 between the categories in that survey year
*** p < .001 between the categories in that survey year
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There were statistically significant differences between the races in both years. 
Whites had a decrease in their satisfaction with police protection and nonwhites 
increased. Additionally, the two lowest income groups had an increase. Tf a respondent 
earned less than $25,000 they were more satisfied with police protection and if  they 
earned over $25,000 they were less satisfied in 1993 than in 1990. These differences 
between the income categories were not statistically significant.
The next three tables show the responses of residents in the Metropolitan survey 
area who had called the Omaha Police Department two years prior to the survey. Table 
XVII reflects their answers to the question: "How satisfied were you with how quickly 
the police responded to your call?" In the 1991 survey, 162 people called the police in 
the prior two years. Of those, 59.9 percent were satisfied with the response time. In 
1994, 246 respondents called the police in the past two years and 33.7 percent were 
satisfied with the response times -  a statistically significant reduction. The second part of 
Table XVII combines the satisfied and somewhat satisfied responses and shows the 
demographic characteristics of the individuals who called the police. The top portion of 
Table XVII shows that “don’t know” responses were given by one person (.6 percent) in 
1991 and one person (.4 percent) in 1994. Because a very small percentage of the sample 
answered “don’t know,” I excluded these responses from the table. They were also not 
used in the chi-square calculations. In 1991, one of the individuals would not say which 
race they belonged to. Since that person was a small percentage of my sample, I omitted 
it from the chi-square calculation.
On the bottom half of Table XVII, there was a significant reduction from 1991 to 
1994 in the percentage of people who were satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the 
response time. For race, there was also a drop in the satisfaction in both whites and 
non whites. However, the drop was greater for the whites. There was no change in the
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respondents with incomes of $0-9,999 and drops in the other known income categories. 
Although nonwhites had less of a drop and the low-income category had no change it 
does not support my hypothesis. It only suggests more satisfaction with police response 
times than occurred in the whites or other income categories.
TABLE XVII.— OMAHA AREA SATISFACTION WITH POLICE RESPONSE TIME
1991 (N = 162) 1994 (N = 246) Change
% (N) % (N) Over Years
Satisfied 59.9 (97) 33. 7 (83) p = . 0 0 0
Somewhat Satisfied 23.5 (38) 35. 4 (87) p = . 0 1 5
Somewhat Unsatisfied 6.2 (10) 12 . 2 (30) p=.068
Unsatisfied 9.9 (16) 18 . 3 (45) p = . 0 2 9
Don11 Know . 6 (1) . 4 (1) p=.655
OMAHA AREA DEMOGRAPHICS FOR SATISFIED AND SOMEWHAT SATISFIED
Sample 83. 3 (135) 69. 1 (17 0) p = . 0 0 2
Age
18-34 77 . 1 (37) 63. 9 (62)
35-64 83. 8 (62) 75 (87)
65 + 90. 5 (19) 65. 5 (19)
Don't Know 94 . 4 (17)
Race
White **87 . 0 (120) 71. 2 (151)
Nonwhite 63. 6 (14) 59.4 (19)
Income
$0-9,999 71. 4 (15) 71.4 (10)
$10-24,999 83.3 (35) 62 .1 (36)
$25-49,999 90 . 9 (50) 70.3 (64)
$50,000+ 82 .1 (23) 72 . 4 (42)
Don't Know 80.0 (12) 81.8 (9)
Gender
Male 86.4 (57) 69.1 (76)
Female 82. 1 (78) 69. 6 (94)
* p < .05 between the categories in that survey year
** p < .01 between the categories in that survey year
*** p < .001 between the categories in that survey year
Individuals who called the OPD during the past two years prior to the surveys 
were also asked if the officers were courteous, helpful, and professional. Table XVIII
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contains the results. In the 1991 survey, 85.2 percent of these respondents said the officer 
was always courteous, 79 percent said they were always helpful, and 83.3 percent said the 
officer was always professional, By 1994, the percentages in each of these three 
categories had decreased significantly to 55.7 percent, 49.2 percent, and 63.4 percent 
respectively.
TABLE XVIII.— ASSESSMENT OF OFFICER CHARACTERISTICS BY RESPONDENTS FROM
METROPOLITAN SURVEY WHO CALLED THE OPD
1991 (N = 162) 1994 (N = 246) Change
% (N) % (N) Over Years
A. Was Officer Courteous
Always 85. 2 (138) 55. 7 (137) p = . 0 0 0
Most Of The Time 8 . 0 (13) 20. 3 (50) p = . 001
Some Of The Time 3.1 (5) 15. 4 (38) p = . 0 0 0
Never 2.5 (4) 3 . 7 (9) p=.700
Don't Know 1.2 (2) 4 . 9 (12) p=.083
B. Was Officer Helpful
Always 79.0 (128) 49.2 (121) p = .  0 0 0
Most Of The Time 6.2 (10) 18 . 7 (46) p = . 0 0 0
Some Of The Time 8 . 6 (14) 17 . 5 (43) p = .  0 1 7
Never 4 . 3 (7) 9.8 (24) p=.063
Don't Know 1.9 (3) 4 . 9 (12) p=.193
C. Was Officer Professional
Always 83 . 3 (135) 63 . 4 (156) p = . 0 0 0
Most Of The Time 6.8 (11) 17 . 9 (44) p = .  0 0 2
Some Of The Time 3.1 (5) 10. 6 (26) p = . 0 0 9
Never 3 . 7 (6) 3.3 (8) p=.952
Don't Know 3.1 (5) 4 . 9 (12) p=.525
Table XIX combines the “always” and “most of the time” responses listed in 
Table XVIII and shows the demographic characteristics for Omaha on each of the three 
officer characteristics. Because less than five percent of the sample answered “don’t 
know,” I again excluded these responses from the chi-square calculations of the 
demographics portion of the table. Also in the demographics, if any of the respondent
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TABLE XIX.— DEMOGRAPHICS WHEN RESPONDENTS ANSWERED "ALWAYS" OR "MOST OF
THE TIME" FOR OFFICER CHARACTERISTICS
1991 1994 Change
(N) % (N) Over Years
Was Officer Courteous 93.2 (151) 76.0 (187)
Age
18-34 *85.7 (42) *72.5 (66)
35-64 97.2 (70) 82 . 6 (95)
65 + 100 . 0 (21) 96.0 (24)
Don't Know 100 . 0 (18)
Race
White * * * 97 .1 (134) ***83.7 (169)
Nonwhite 76.2 (16) 56.3 (18)
Income
$0-9,999 90 . 0 (18) 64 . 3 (9)
$10-24,999 92 . 9 (39) 72 . 2 (39)
$25-49,999 94 . 6 (53) 84 . 3 (75)
$50,000+ 100 . 0 (27) 83. 3 (45)
Don't Know 93.3 (14) 81.8 (9)
Gender
Male 93. 8 (61) 78 . 1 (82)
Female 94 . 7 (90) 81.4 (105)
Was Officer Helpful 85.2 (138) 67. 9 (167)
Age
18-34 *75 . 5 (37) 68 .1 (62)
35-64 88 . 7 (63) 73.7 (84)
65 + 100. 0 (21) 73. 1 (19)
Don't Know 94 . 4 (17)
Race
White *89. 1 (122) 73.3 (148)
Nonwhite 71. 4 (15) 59.4 (19)
Income
$0-9,999 85. 0 (17) 64 . 3 (9)
$10-24,999 83.3 (35) 61.1 (33)
$25-49,999 89.1 (49) 76.1 (67)
$50,000+ 85.2 (23) 70 . 9 (39)
Don't Know 93. 3 (14) 90 . 9 (10)
Gender
Male 84 . 6 (55) 70.5 (74)
Female 88 . 3 (83) 72 . 1 (93)
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TABLE XIX.— CONTINUED
1991 1994 Change
(N) % (N) Over Years
Was Officer Professional 90.1 (146) 81.3 (200)
Age
18-34 87 . 5 (42) 81.5 (75)
35-64 94 . 3 (66) 87 . 7 (100)
65 + 95. 2 (20) 92 . 0 (23)
Don't Know 100. 0 (18)
Race
White **95.6 (129) ***88 . 6 (179)
Nonwhite 76.2 (16) 65. 6 (21)
Income
$0-9,999 95.0 (19) 92 . 9 (13)
$10-24,999 90. 5 (38) 81. 5 (44)
$25-49,999 92. 6 (50) 86.4 (76)
$50,000+ 96.2 (25) 85.5 (47)
Don't Know 93.3 (14) 90. 9 (10)
Gender
Male 90. 6 (58) 81. 9 (86)
Female 94 . 6 (88) 88 . 4 (114)
* p < .05 between the categories in that survey year
** p < .01 between the categories in that survey year
*** p < .001 between the categories in that survey year
didn’t know or didn’t report which demographic category they belonged to and it was 
below five percent, I also deleted those demographic categories and figured the 
percentage and chi-square without them.
There was a significant decrease from 1991 to 1994 in the number of people who 
said the officers were courteous, helpful, and professional in Table XIX. Both of the race 
categories decreased under each of these officer characteristics. The decrease was larger 
in the nonwhites for courteous and professional. Each of the income categories decreased 
from 1991 to 1994. The two lowest income categories had the biggest decrease for 
courteous and helpful. For professional, the lowest income category decreased the least.
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TABLE XX.— ASSESSMENT OF OFFICER BEHAVIOR BY METROPOLITAN RESPONDENTS
WHO WERE STOPPED BY OPD
1991 (N = 205) 1994 (N = 264) Change
o_
o (N) % (N) Over Years
A. Courteous
Yes 88.3 (181) 84 . 5 (223) p=.295
No 11.7 (24) 13.2 (35) p=.7 2 9
Don't Know 0 2.3 (6) p=.07 6
Demographics For Yes Response
Age
18-34 82 . 4 (56) *81. 0 (85)
35-64 88 .5 (77) 92 .2 (107)
65+ 96.4 (27) 83. 3 (30)
Don't Know 95. 5 (21)
Race
White ***91.1 (164) ***89.5 (196)
Nonwhite 65.2 (15) 69.2 (27)
Income
$0-9,999 73.3 (11) 84 . 6 (11)
$10-24,999 85.2 (46) 80. 6 (50)
$25-49,999 91. 4 (74) 86. 7 (85)
$50,000+ 85. 3 (29) 93.7 (59)
Don't Know 100.0 (21) 75.0 (9)
Gender
Male 85.0 (85) 83.9 (120)
Female 91. 4 (96) 89. 6 (103)
B. Professional
Yes 92 . 2 (189) 89.0 (235) p=.313
No 7.8 (16) 8.7 (23) p=.85 6
Don’t Know 0 2.3 (6) p=.076
Demographics For Yes Response
Age
18-34 94 . 0 (63) 86.7 (91)
35-64 87.5 (77) 94. 9 (111)
65+ 96. 4 (27) 91. 4 (32)
Don't Know 100.0 (22)
Race
White **93.9 (169) ***93.6 (205)
Nonwhite 78.3 (18) 76.9 (30)
Income
$0-9,999 86.7 (13) 100.0 (12)
$10-24,999 90.7 (49) 87 .1 (54)
$25-49,999 95.1 (77) 91. 8 (90)
$50,000+ 88.2 (30) 95.2 (60)
Don't Know 95.2 (20) 75. 0 (9)
Gender
Male 88.9 (88) 90.2 (129)
Female 95.3 (101) 92.2 (106)
* p < .05 between the categories in that survey year
** p < .01 between the categories in that survey year
*** p < .001 between the categories in that survey year
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The data in Table XIX does not support my hypothesis for the entire city of Omaha. It 
also appears that COP had no effect on the nonwhites and low-income population.
Table XX contains the results of the Metropolitan survey for the question: "Have 
you ever, at any time, been stopped by a Omaha Police Department Officer?" In 1991, 
there were 205 people who said an OPD officer had stopped them. Of those, 88.3 percent 
said the officer was courteous and 92.2 percent said the officer was professional. In 
1994, there were 264 respondents who reported being stopped by an OPD officer. There 
was an insignificant decrease in the percentage of these people who said the officer was 
courteous (84.5 percent) and professional (89 percent). For the demographic portion of 
the table, 2.3 percent of the respondents in 1994 said they didn’t know if the officer was 
courteous or professional. This response was dropped from the chi-square analysis and 
also omitted when the percentages were calculated because it was such a small number. 
There was a decrease in the percentage of whites who said the officer was courteous, but 
an increase in the nonwhites. Under income, there was an increase in the $0-9,999 and 
$50,000 plus categories. For professionalism there was a decline in both race categories 
and an increase in the $0-9,999 and $50,000 plus categories.
Tables XXI and XXII contain the views of individuals in the 1991 and 1994 
Metropolitan Survey toward the OPD officers. The tables show the percentage and the 
number of individuals who “strongly agree/agree,” are “undecided,” “disagree/strongly 
disagree,” or “don't know” on a number of questions that measure the OPD officers’ 
demeanor and characteristics. Demographic characteristics are shown under each 
question for the percentage and number of respondents who "strongly agree" and "agree" 
with each statement. “Don’t know” responses to the questions were given by over five 
percent of the respondents for items “c” and “e” in Table XXI, along with all the 
questions in Table XXII. For these questions the chi-square was calculated for both years
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TABLE XXI.— OMAHA'S VIEWS ON DEMEANOR OF OPD OFFICERS
1991 1994
oo (N) oo (N)
A. Omaha police officers arei usually courteous
Strongly Agree/Agree 86.8 (348) 86.8 (429)
Undecided 5.0 (20) 5.5 (27)
Disagree/Strongly Disagree 5.0 (20) 5.3 (26)
Don't Know 3.2 (13) 2.4 (12)
Demographics For Strongly Ag:ree/Agree Response
Age
18-34 85.1 (86) 84 . 6 (154)
35-64 89.6 (138) 91.3 (190)
65 + 96. 0 (72) 93. 1 (81)
Don't Know 89.7 (52)
Race
White ***93.5 (315) ***91.7 (385)
Nonwhite 62 . 5 (30) 70 . 5 (43)
Income
$0-9,999 *78 . 0 (39) 84 . 6 (22)
$10-24,999 87 . 6 (78) 85 . 7 (96)
$25-49,999 92 . 9 (130) 90 . 3 (168)
$50,000+ 96. 4 (54) 91. 8 (101)
Don't Know 88 . 7 (47) 83.3 (20)
Gender
Male 89.3 (134) **85.1 (194)
Female 89.9 (214) 92 . 5 (235)
B. Omaha police officers are respectful toward people lik«
Strongly Agree/Agree 84 . 8 (340) 83. 6 (413)
Undecided 5.5 (22) 6.1 (30)
Disagree/Strongly Disagree 6.5 (26) 6.9 (34)
Don't Know 3.2 (13) 3.4 (17)
Demographics For Strongly Agree/Agree Response
Age
18-34 *85.3 (87) **79.4 (143)
35-64 87 .1 (135) 88.3 (182)
65 + 94 .5 (69) 96.5 (83)
Don't Know 84 .5 (49)
Race
White * * * g . 7 (309) ***90^9 (378)
Nonwhite 60. 4 (29) 57 . 4 (35)
Income
$0-9,999 **82 . 0 (41) 76.9 (20)
$10-24,999 88 . 9 (80) 78 . 2 (86)
$25-49,999 92 . 1 (129) 89.1 (164)
$50,000+ 87 . 5 (49) 92 . 7 (102)
Don't Know 78.8 (41) 82 . 6 (19)
Gender
Male 86.7 (130) **81.3 (182)
female 88 . 2 (210) 91. 3 (231)
Changes 
Over Years
p=.921 
p=.8 55 
p=.960
p=.602
p=.692
p=.812
p=.918 
p=.983
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TABLE XXI.— CONTINUED
1991 1994 Change
o*o (N) o*o (N) Over Years
C . Omaha police officers use morei force than they need to in carrying
out their duties
Strongly Agree/Agree 17 . 0 (68) 15. 8 (78) p=.695
Undecided 21.7 (87) 15. 0 (74) p = . 0 1 2
Disagree/Strongly Disagree 53.4 (214) 63.2 (312) p = . 00 4
Don 11 Know 8 . 0 (32) 6.1 (30) p=.327
Demogr•aphics For Strongly Agree/Agree Response
Age
18-34 14 . 4 (15) ***18.8 (35)
35-64 16.3 (26) 13. 6 (29)
65 + 20.8 (16) 14 . 4 (13)
Don't Know 18 . 3 (11)
Race
White 8 (41) ***10.9 (47)
Nonwhite 50. 0 (25) 50 . 0 (31)
Income
$0-9,999 *30. 8 (16) ***35.7 (10)
$10-24,999 16.3 (15) 19. 0 (22)
$25-49,999 13.3 (19) 11.3 (21)
$50,000+ 10. 5 (6) 9.7 (11)
Don't Know 21.1 (12) 26.9 (7)
Gender
Male **15.1 (23) 14 . 7 (34)
Female 18. 1 (45) 16.8 (44)
D. Most police officers are usually rude
Strongly Agree/Agree 6.5 (26) 7.5 (37) p=.653
Undecided 9.7 (39) 6.5 (32) p=.102
Disagree/Strongly Disagree 80.0 (321) 82 . 8 (409) p=.324
Don't Know 3.7 (15) 3.2 (16) p=.823
Demographics For Strongly Agree/Agree Response
Age
18-34 6.8 (7) *12 . 9 (23)
35-64 6.5 (10) 5.3 (11)
65 + 5.6 (4) 3.5 (3)
Don't Know 8 . 8 (5)
Race
White ***4.8 (16) ***6.0 (25)
Nonwhite 21.3 (10) 20. 0 (12)
Income
$0-9,999 12 . 2 (6) 7 . 7 (2)
$10-24,999 7.8 (7) 10. 9 (12)
$25-49,999 5.0 (7) 6.0 (11)
$50,000+ 5.5 (3) 6.4 (7)
Don't Know 5.8 (3) 12. 5 (3)
Gender
Male 6. 8 (10) 9.7 (22)
Female 6.7 (16) 6.0 (15)
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TABLE XXI.— CONTINUED
1991 
% (N)
1994 
% (N)
Change 
Over Years
E . Police officers show concern when you ask them questions
Strongly Agree/Agree 73.3 (294) 74.5 (368) p=.741
Undecided 15.7 (63) 10.3 (51) p=.021
Disagree/Strongly Disagree 5.5 (22) 10.5 (52) p = . 01 0
Don't Know 5.5 (22) 4.7 (23) p=.697
Demographics For Strongly Agre e/Agree Response
Age
18-34 69.2 (72) ***66.7 (124)
35-64 72.5 (116) 77.5 (165)
65 +
Don't Know
81.8 (63) 
71.7 (43)
83.3 (75)
Race
White ***76.7 (266) *76.6 (330)
Nonwhite 52.0 (26) 61.3 (38)
Income
$0-9,999 *73.1 (38) *64.3 (18)
$10-24,999 69.6 (64) 72.4 (84)
$25-49,999 83.2 (119) 76.9 (143)
$50,000+ 73.7 (42) 74.3 (84)
Don't Know 54.4 (31) 80.8 (21)
Gender
Male 73.0 (111) 72.8 (169)
Female 73.8 (183) 76.0 (199)
* p < .05 between the categories in that survey year
** p < .01 between the categories in that survey year
*** p < .001 between the categories in that survey year
with the “don’t know” response in. This was done so the numbers would remain 
consistent across time making it easier to compare changes from one year to the other.
In Table XXI, the only question that showed an improvement in the officers’ 
demeanor in Omaha was item “c” (the use of force by the officers). The percentage of 
people who agreed with this statement decreased and the number who disagreed with it 
increased significantly. Because both of the agree and disagree categories for question 
“e” had an increase, I can not say there was an improvement over time. When asked if
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TABLE XXII.— OMAHA'S VIEWS ABOUT OPD OFFICERS' CHARACTERISTICS
1991 1994 Change
(N) % (N) Over Years
A. Omaha police officers are physically fit
Strongly Agree/Agree 63.1 (253) 66. 0 (326) p=.405
Undecided 20.7 (83) 15 . 0 (74) p = . 0 3 2
Disagree/Strongly Disagree 10.7 (43) 14 . 6 (72) p=.102
Don't Know 5.5 (22) 4.5 (22) p=.5 95
Demographics For Strongly Agree/Agree Response
Age
18-34 ***51.9 (54) **60.8 (113)
35-64 60 . 6 (97) 64 . 8 (138)
65 + 85 . 7 (66) 78 . 9 (71)
Don't Know 60. 0 (36)
Race
White 62. 2 (216) 67 . 3 (290)
Nonwhite 70 . 0 (35) 58 .1 (36)
Income
$0-9,999 71.2 (37) 71. 4 (20)
$10-24,999 67 . 4 (62) 69 . 0 (80)
$25-49,999 65.7 (94) 67.2 (125)
$50,000+ 49.1 (28) 61.1 (69)
Don't Know 56.1 (32) 69.2 (18)
Gender
Male 59.2 (90) 64 .2 (149)
Female 65.7 (163) 67. 6 (177)
B. Omaha police officers are prejudiced against: minority persons
Strongly Agree/Agree 17.5 (70) 14 .2 (70) p=.208
Undecided 23.9 (96) 18 . 4 (91) p=.053
Disagree/Strongly Disagree 49.1 (197) 60 . 9 (301) p = . 0 0 0
Don 11 Know 9.5 (38) 6.5 (32) p=.125
Demographics For Strongly Agree/Agree Response
Age
18-34 ***22.1 (23) *15. 6 (29)
35-64 18 .1 (29) 15 . 0 (32)
65 + 15.6 (12) 8 . 9 (8)
Don't Know 10 . 0 (6)
Race
White ^2 . 7 (44) •k  -k  -k  g  Q (39)
Nonwhite 52.0 (26) 50 . 0 (31)
Income
$0-9,999 28 . 8 (15) **25 . 0 (7)
$10-24,999 16.3 (15) 17 .2 (20)
$25-49,999 14 . 0 (20) 15 .1 (28)
$50,000+ 22 . 8 (13) 8.0 (9)
Don't Know 12 . 3 (7) 11.5 (3)
Gender
Male *14 . 5 (22) 16.4 (38)
Female 19 . 4 (48) 12.2 (32)
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TABLE XXII.— CONTINUED
1991 
% (N)
1994
O, (N)
Change 
Over Years
C . Omaha police officers arei not able to answer citizens1 questions correctly
Strongly Agree/Agree 9.5 (38) 13. 6 (67) p=.07 4
Undecided 21.7 (87) 17 . 8 (88) p=.168
Disagree/Strongly Disagree 58.1 (233) 62. 6 (309) p=.193
Don't Know 10.7 (43) 6.1 (30) p = . 0 1 7
Demographics For Strongly Agree/Agree Response
Age
18-34 9.6 (10) 15. 6 (29)
35-64 9.4 (15) 10. 3 (22)
65 + 10.4 (8) 16.7 (15)
Don't Know 8.3 (5)
Race
White **7.5 (26) ***10.0 (43)
Nonwhite 22.0 (11) 37 .1 (23)
Income
$0-9,999 **23 .1 (12) ***39.3 (11)
$10-24,999 12.0 (11) 17.2 (20)
$25-49,999 3.5 (5) 12 . 4 (23)
$50,000+ 10. 5 (6) 7 . 1 (8)
Don't Know 7.0 (4) 7 . 7 (2)
Gender
Male 7.9 (12) 15. 9 (37)
Female 10.5 (26) 11.5 (30)
D . Omaha police <officers respond quickly to calls for service
Strongly Agree/Agree 59.6 (239) 57 .1 (282) p=.493
Undecided 17.5 (70) 13. 2 (65) p=.091
Disagree/Strongly Disagree 16.0 (64) 23.7 (117) p = . 0 0 6
Don't Know 7.0 (28) 6.1 (30) p=.684
Demographics For Strongly Agree/Agree Response
Age
18-34 51.0 (53) 53.2 (99)
35-64 56.9 (91) 59.6 (127)
65 + 75. 3 (58) 58. 9 (53)
Don't Know 61.7 (37)
Race
White ***61.1 (212) ***60.3 (260)
Nonwhite 52. 0 (26) 35.5 (22)
Income
$0-9,999 53. 8 (28) 57 .1 (16)
$10-24,999 62.0 (57) 56. 9 (66)
$25-49,999 65. 0 (93) 55. 9 (104)
$50,000+ 57 . 9 (33) 60.2 (68)
Don't Know 49.1 (28) 46.2 (12)
Gender
Male 64 . 5 (98) 57.8 (134)
Female 56. 9 (141) 56.5 (148)
* p < .05 between the categories in that survey year
** p < .01 between the categories in that survey year
*** p < .001 between the categories in that survey year
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the officer was courteous, more nonwhites agreed in 1994 than in 1991 but the opposite 
occurred for the whites. The $0-9,999 income category also had an increase while the 
others had a decrease over time. More whites and less nonwhites, along with the $0- 
9,999 income category said officers were rude. Finally, there was an increase in the
TABLE XXIII.-SUPPORT FOR FOURTH HYPOTHESIS
Item Omaha O.H.A. Nonwhite $0-9,999
Law Enforcement (LE) is the best 
thing about Omaha No Yes
LE is the worst thing about Omaha No No
LE is the worst thing in 
neighborhood Yes No
LE is important problem in Omaha No Yes
LE is important problem in 
neighborhood Yes
Satisfaction w/police protection No Yes Yes
Satisfaction w/response time No No No
Called-was officer courteous No No No
Called-was officer helpful No No No
Called-was officer professional No No No
Stopped-was officer courteous No Yes Yes
Stopped-was officer professional No No Yes
Omaha officers usually courteous No Yes Yes
Omaha officers respectful No No No
Omaha officer use excessive force Yes No No
Most officers are rude No Yes Yes
Officers show concern when asked 
questions No Yes No
Omaha officers are physically fit No No Yes
Omaha officers are prejudiced 
against minority persons Yes Yes Yes
Omaha officers can't answers 
questions correctly No No No
Omaha officers respond quickly 
to calls No No Yes
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nonwhites who said officers show concern when asked questions. For the whites there 
was no change.
The only question in Table XXII that showed an improvement in the officers’ 
characteristics for the entire city of Omaha was: “Omaha police officers are prejudiced 
against minority persons.” The percentage of people who agreed with this statement 
decreased insignificantly, and the number who disagreed with it increased significantly 
by 11.8 percent from 1991 to 1994. Both race categories had a decrease in the percentage 
of respondents who agreed with this statement, and those in the $0-9,999 and $50,000 
plus income categories also had a decrease.
When asked if “Omaha police officers are physically fit,” there was an increase in 
the percentage of respondents who both agreed and disagreed with the statement. Both of 
these increases make it difficult to say that this statement supports my hypothesis. For 
race, more whites and less nonwhites agreed with the statement in 1994. The reply does 
not appear to be influenced by income as each category increased in 1994.
There was also a significant increase in the respondents who disagreed with the 
statement “Omaha police officers respond quickly to calls for service.” In the income 
category, the respondents who earned $0-9,999 had the biggest increase over 1991 in 
those who agreed that Omaha police officers respond quickly to calls.
For Omaha, only four questions went in the predicted direction. Thus there is not 
enough support for the hypothesis. In the O.H.A. area I am unable to determine if there is 
support for the hypothesis because of the mixed results for law enforcement. Some
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positive improvements were seen for the nonwhites and the $0-9,999 income category 
that were not reflected in the total Omaha data.
TABLE XXIV.— SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
AND 15
YEARS FOR TABLES 10, 11,
1990-1991 1991-1994 1990-1994
VICTIMIZATION
Break-Ins (Omaha) . 0 0 6 . 068 .335
Break-Ins (O.H.A.) . 171
Attempted Break-Ins (Omaha) . 0 0 8 . 0 1 6 . 828
Attempted Break-Ins (O.H.A.) .462
Stolen Outside (Omaha) . 014 . 0 0 7 . 941
Stolen Outside (O.H.A.) . 685
CITIZENS' PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME
Better (Omaha) . 349 . 184 . 870
Better (O.H.A.) .216
Same (Omaha) . 001 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
Same (O.H.A.) . 0 4 5
Worse (Omaha) . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 001
Worse (O.H.A.) . 0 0 3
DEGREE OF WORRY ABOUT CRIME
Very Worried (Omaha) . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 136
Very Worried (O.H.A.) . O i l
Little Worried (Omaha) . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 558
Little Worried (O.H.A.) . 0 2 0
Not Worried (Omaha) .056 . 0 0 0 . Ill
Not Worried (O.H.A.) . 941
Conclusion and Discussion 
The police department in Omaha, Nebraska has made great strides implementing 
community oriented policing. They started in 1989 by placing 15 officers in the O.H.A 
low-income housing developments. In July 1990, this team of officers became known as 
the Selective Patrol Unit and started utilizing COP. Within a couple of years COP
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expanded to other parts of Omaha under the Weed and Seed program. Some of these 
areas included additional minority and low-income neighborhoods. In December 1993, 
the Omaha Police Department started the process of implementing COP city-wide. This 
study has looked at COP in Omaha to see if the philosophy was effective in producing the 
expected changes predicted in my four hypotheses.
For the entire city of Omaha, the changes that were predicted did not occur. None 
of the data evaluated supported any of the four hypotheses For the first hypothesis, there 
was not a decrease in crime. The total number of UCR Index crimes increased 12.9 
percent, crimes against persons increased 54.9 percent, and crimes against property 
increased 8 percent. The second part of this hypothesis looked at the victimization data. 
From 1990 to 1994 break-ins and attempted break-ins decreased in Omaha, but it was not 
statistically significant. The second hypothesis said that citizens will perceive crime as 
less of a problem as COP is implemented. This hypothesis was not supported by the data 
from Omaha because there was a statistically significant increase in the number of people 
who felt the crime situation was worse in 1994 than in 1990. When asked about their 
priority of crime, there was a large percentage increase in the number of individuals who 
said crime was the worst thing about Omaha. The third hypothesis predicted that fear of 
crime would decrease as COP is implemented. However, Omaha had an insignificant 
increase in the percentage of people “very worried” about crime and an insignificant 
decrease in those “not worried” about crime. For the final hypothesis on quality of 
interaction with the Omaha Police Department, there were only four questions that
131
showed an increase in citizens’ attitudes, perceptions, and satisfaction with the Omaha 
Police Department. This small number of positive responses does not support the 
hypothesis.
In the O.H.A. area there is evidence that COP produced the changes predicted in 
my hypotheses. For the first hypothesis on crime, the total UCR Index crimes decreased 
along with crimes against property, supporting the hypothesis. Under the victimization 
portion of this first hypothesis all three crimes decreased, but the decrease was not 
statistically significant. Regarding the second hypothesis, there was a statistically 
insignificant increase in the number of people who said the crime situation was better in 
Omaha and a statistically significant decrease in the number who said it was worse, again 
supporting the hypothesis. As for the priority of crimes, there also was support for the 
second hypothesis as the number of respondents decreased who said crime was the worst 
thing in their neighborhood. The third hypothesis is supported in that residents in the 
O.H.A. area had a statistically significant decrease of 26.2 percent in those who were very 
worried about crime. For the fourth hypothesis, citizens’ attitudes, perceptions, and 
satisfaction with the Omaha Police Department were mixed making it hard to draw any 
type of conclusion.
There is a limitation to the conclusions drawn from the O.H.A. sample. The 
North Omaha portion of the OCS where this sample was obtained did not indicate if the 
respondents lived in or around the O.H.A. housing developments. So this sample 
included respondents in the same zip codes as the housing developments with incomes
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below $10,000 per year. Because this O.H.A. subsample may not accurately represent 
the O.H.A. area, the findings may not reflect what is actually occurring in or around these 
low-income housing developments.
As for race and income there was a mixture of support for the hypotheses. The 
victimization data and fear of crime were two of these areas for race. Under income, 
citizens’ perceptions of crime and fear of crime support the hypothesis. Finally, one 
positive aspect that support the last hypothesis was the improvements over time in the 
nonwhites and the $0-9,999 income categories especially when they were compared to 
the negative trends in Omaha. This appears to be a good indication that nonwhites and 
low-income residents had improved feelings about the police.
However, caution must be used when interpreting the O.H.A. results because there 
is only two years of survey data. As in the Omaha data, negative trends in subsequent 
years could also occur in the O.H.A. area. The only way to boost the confidence of the 
findings in the O.H.A. area is to collect more data beyond the last year included in this 
study.
Another word of caution is that this study was not a true time-series analysis. 
Because I do not have three years of data before Omaha started implementing COP there 
is no indication of what the trend was before 1990 for the survey questions. An upward 
or downward trend from the previous years might have continued with the data in this 
study and I would not be able to recognize it. Since I do not know what the previous 
years were and if a trend was going up or down, I can not say with confidence that
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community oriented policing brought about the change. I can only draw conclusions on 
changes between the time periods of the data being evaluated and say that it appears to be 
caused by community oriented policing.
Given the situation in Omaha, these results are not surprising. During the time 
period that this study looked at, COP was slowly being implemented in the city. But, the 
majority of the COP efforts were focused in the Omaha Housing Development’s low- 
income housing areas and also expanded to other low-income areas in Omaha. In essence 
there were two different programs occurring with different dosages of COP being given 
to Omaha. There was a large amount given to the low-income areas and a small amount 
applied to the city of Omaha as a whole. These different amounts of community oriented 
policing may be affecting the findings in this study.
This study should be the beginning of a more thorough evaluation of COP in 
Omaha, Nebraska. The Omaha Conditions Surveys should continue to ask many of the 
same questions that were used in this study. The additional data from these surveys will 
be helpful in answering many of the same questions I asked as Omaha continues to 
implement community oriented policing into the year 1999.
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